UZBEKS VERSUS THE CENTER:
MOBILIZATION AS AN ETHNIC MINORITY IN THE TAJIKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN CIVIL WARS

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1. Introduction

What I seek to address in this paper is the question of why, during the 1990s, an ethnic Uzbek faction in Afghanistan successfully mobilized, politically and militarily, while no such mobilization occurred for the Uzbek community in Tajikistan. During both the Afghan and Tajik civil wars of the 1990s, various factions fought each other for control of the state or for regional autonomy within their countries. These factions were based either on religion, ideology, ethnicity, region, patronage, or a combination of these. In Afghanistan a strong ethnic Uzbek-dominated faction, Junbesh-i Milli, fought against all other factions and earned autonomy for the Uzbek minority, at least until the Taliban invasion of northern Afghanistan. By contrast, in Tajikistan the Uzbek minority had no leader or organization that effectively united Uzbeks to fight for Uzbek interests, despite the Uzbeks being a higher percentage of the population in Tajikistan than in Afghanistan.[1]

In this paper I will address the disparity in levels of ethnic Uzbek political and military mobilization between Afghanistan and Tajikistan using four variables: (1) The credible commitment problem, (2) political opportunity, (3) external support and (4) mobilizing structures. Using these variables it will be shown that all four variables worked to encourage Uzbek political and military mobilization in Afghanistan. By contrast, only political opportunity worked in favor of encouraging political mobilization for the Uzbeks in Tajikistan. The Uzbek community in Tajikistan remained fractured and without direction throughout the Tajik civil war and the years of state consolidation afterwards.

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[1] The 1989 census in Tajikistan showed Uzbeks as 23.5% of the population while the 2000 census showed 13.5%. Source: Naselenie Respubliki Tadzhikistan 2000 quoted in Fumagalli, Matteo. (2005) 'The Dynamics of Uzbek Ethno-political Mobilization in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: 1991-2003', Ph. D. Dissertation. University of Edinburgh, p. 89. The theories for this percentage of population decrease are given on pages 37-8 in this paper (mine, not Fumagalli's). The CIA's estimate for the Uzbek percentage of the population in Afghanistan is 9%, source: *The World Factbook 2006: Afghanistan*, online at: www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html

2. Theory   2.1. The credible commitment problem

According to James Fearon, a commitment problem occurs when two groups do not have a third party that can effectively guarantee agreements between the groups, a problem that is especially apparent when the two groups are acting in an environment of political anarchy.[2] If one of the groups believes that the other side can not or will not credibly commit to keep its promises, with or without a third party to guarantee the agreements, that group will prefer to fight, or continue fighting, rather than chance that it will be in a position of vulnerability in the future and be unable to protect itself.[3] Applied to an ethnic conflict, this could mean that a minority group would consider it preferable to fight the state or opposing group immediately, especially when the state is weak, instead of accepting the promises of their opponents when there is no guarantee that the majority group or state will not renege in the future. However, Fearon does warn that these groups should not be considered "unitary actors" when the group's decisions are actually the result of complex internal politics.[4] David Lake and Donald Rothchild identify some of those involved in these internal group politics as "ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs" that often encourage fears about the intentions of the opposing group and create uncertainty about the future safety of the ethnic group.[5]

Erin Jenne expands on this theory and connects the credible commitment argument to the issue of external support for an ethnic minority group. She argues that an ethnic minority will "radicalize" its demands if it believes it has external support for its cause, even if the ethnic minority believes that the state or dominant group will commit to its agreements. Jenne argues that minority demands and actions are not just a result of ethnic fear but are also a rational choice based on the amount of support they perceive that they will gain if they enter into conflict.[6]

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[2] Fearon, James D. (1998) 'Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict', in Lake and Rothchild, (eds.), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*. New York: Princeton University Press, pp. 108, 123; and Fearon, James D. (1995) 'Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem', Paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meetings of APSA, online at: http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/papers/ethcprob.pdf

[3] Fearon (1995), op cit, p. 10.

[4] Fearon (1998), op cit, pp. 109, 119. Example of the minority Serbs in Croatia on page 116.

[5] Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild. (1996) 'Containing Fear', *International Security*, 21(2), p. 41.

[6] Jenne, Erin. (2004) 'A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, p. 729.

2.2. Political Opportunity: The political opportunity thesis is based on the simple belief that social movements are able to better mobilize when the opportunity exists.[7] Doug McAdam identifies the dimensions of political opportunity as:

> (1) The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system.(2) The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically under-gird a polity. (3) The presence or absence of elite allies. (4) The state's capacity and propensity for repression.[8]

Sidney Tarrow states that when people see the political opportunity structure as favorable to their expectations for success they will mobilize for collective action.[9] Tarrow is careful to add that the political opportunity environment is not fixed, but an environment which changes due to a number of factors and which actors themselves can alter.[10]

By itself the political opportunity thesis is "tautological;" if a group successfully confronts the state or the dominant group then there must have been an opportunity. However, increasing political opportunities are not sufficient for success, let alone for the initial mobilization.[11] Since political opportunity on its own is unable to explain collective action, an analysis must also include a group's motivations, its ability to act, and its collective identity.[12] The tautological problem of political opportunity is further remedied by ensuring that an analysis includes the group's mobilizing structures and its ability to "frame" its actions and goals to its followers. The addition of an analysis of framing and mobilizing structures to political opportunity results in a "political process theory" analysis.[13]

2.3. External support: For an ethnic group to be successful in its attempt to secede, or even to attain regional autonomy or a federal government arrangement, the ethnic group must be the

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[7] Meyer, David and Debra Minkoff. (2004) 'Conceptualizing Political Opportunity', *Social Forces*, (82)4, p. 1484; Koopmans, Ruud. (1999) 'Political. Opportunity. Structure.', *Sociological Forum*, (14)1, p. 96; Tarrow, Sidney. (1994) *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge University Press, pp.17-18.

[8] McAdam, Doug. (1996) 'Conceptual Origins, Problems and Future Directions', in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge University Press, p. 27.

[9] Tarrow (1994), op cit, p. 85.

[10] Meyer, David S. and Suzanne Staggenborg. (1996) 'Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity', *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 101, No. 6 (May 1996), p. 1634.

[11] Goodwin, Jeff and James M. Jasper. (1999) 'Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory', *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March, 1999), p. 31, 43.

[12] Koopmans (1999), op cit, pp. 97, 100.

[13] McAdam, McCarthy, Zald. (1996) op cit, p. 2. Critique of this theory, see Goodwin and Jasper (1999), op cit.

recipient of considerable foreign assistance.[14] If a secessionist group, which is usually weaker than the state that it is confronting, fails to attract external assistance it will likely be defeated or be forced to abandon its goals.[15] Though many states provide support, covertly or openly, to insurgents in other countries, they are somewhat more cautious when the group they support is attempting to secede from that country, partly due to pressure from the pro-state international system. However, states usually make decisions on a case-by-case basis.[16]

When a government provides support for an insurgent group in another state it is usually for geopolitical reasons rather than for reasons of ideology, religious belief or ethnic affinity.[17] Of particular significance when supporting a separatist group are the government's relations with the state in which the minority group is located. For example, a state may provide support to a group in a neighboring country for reasons of internal security, especially if the group they support is a counter to an exiled antigovernment group or to a hostile government.[18] Most importantly, it is usually the states that act out of instrumental motives such as economic gain, domestic politics or strategic considerations, rather than those states that act for affective motives such as ideology, moral principles or ethnic ties, that are the most reliable supporters.[19]

Rajat Ganguly's study of ethnic conflict in South Asia illustrates that, despite the prevalent assumption that an ethnic kin state will support its co-ethnics in a neighboring state, there are actually a number of different responses, ranging from isolation to active involvement.[20] The most common response for an ethnic kin state when confronted with co-ethnics launching a secessionist attempt in a neighboring country is to provide military aid, but not political and diplomatic support. Furthermore, the level of aid is seldom at a level high

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[14] Horowitz, D. (1991) 'Irredentas and Secessions', in N. Chazan (ed) *Irredentism and International Politics*. Rienner Publishers, pp. 9-11; Byman, D., P. Chalk, B. Hoffman, W. Rosenau and D. Brannan. (2001) 'Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements', RAND. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1405/, p. 10.

[15] Ganguly, Rajat. (1998) *Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: Lessons from South Asia*. New Delhi: Sage Publications, p. 10. Note: Ganguly does not offer any empirical studies to support this assertion; Heraclides, A. (1990) 'Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement', *International Organization*, 44(3): 378.

[16] Heraclides (1990), op cit, pp. 351-3; Ganguly (1998), op cit, pp. 10-11.

[17] Byman, et al (2001), op cit, p. 23.

[18] Horowitz (1991), op cit, p. 19, 35.

[19] Heraclides (1990), op cit, pp. 372-3; Sahadevan, P. (1998) 'Internationalization of Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia', *International Studies*, (35)1, pp. 319, 341; Definitions of instrumental and affective motives see Rothschild, J. (1981) *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework*. Columbia University Press, pp. 184-7; Carment, D. and P. James. (1995) 'Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39(1), pp. 82-3.

[20] Ganguly (1998), op cit, pp. 11, 13-33. Note: Ganguly's analysis includes Pashtuns but not Uzbeks.

enough to ensure success for the secessionists. However, if an ethnic kin state is motivated by both ideological and geopolitical reasons then the level of support is greater.[21]

Stephen Saideman's analysis of external involvement in ethnic conflicts points to weaknesses in the assumption that states that are vulnerable to secessionist movements will refrain from supporting secessionist movements in other states.[22] He concludes that states located in high-conflict regions are the most likely to be involved in supporting secessionists; and that ethnic ties are particularly salient when a state is considering whether to give assistance, especially if politicians are facing pressure from their constituents to protect their ethnic kin in another state.[23] P. Sahadevan offers a simpler explanation, arguing that assistance from an ethnic kin state is common practice because of the proximity of the kin state and the ethnic and linguistic ties that facilitate the assistance.[24]

Rogers Brubaker analyzes the complicated nature of the three-way relationship between an ethnic minority, the nationalizing state whose borders it is within, and the national "homeland" of the ethnic minority within the framework of what he terms a "triadic nexus."[25] While Brubaker does acknowledge that the minority groups he describes are not unitary actors and are indeed composed of competing components, he adopts the use of the term "national minority" as a "loose and imperfect designation."[26] Brubaker, in a later work, again acknowledges the heterogeneous nature of the actors involved in ethnic violence and the inability of current theory to perfectly explain the violence.[27] Erin Jenne, however, finds Brubaker's "triadic nexus" even more problematic than Brubaker's self-critique. She argues that using the triadic nexus to predict or explain the behavior of each of the three components requires them to be thought of as "unitary players," when in fact each player is actually comprised of a "wide spectrum of individual leaders, interest groups, and political parties who regularly compete for

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[21] Ibid, pp. 243-6.

[22] Saideman, S. (2002) 'Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups', *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(1), pp. 29-30, 42, 47; Saideman, S. (1997) 'Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts', *International Organization*, (51)4, pp. 724, 746; see also Heraclides (1990), op cit, p. 353.

[23] Saideman (2002), op cit, p. 42, 40; Saideman (1997), op cit, p. 728. For this argument applied to authoritarian states see Davis, David and Will Moore. (1997) 'Ethnicity Matters', *International Studies Quarterly*, (41)1, p. 173.

[24] Sahadevan (1998), op cit, p. 341.

[25] Brubaker, Rogers. (1996) *Nationalism Reframed*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 55-69.

[26] Brubaker (1996), op cit, pp. 56, 62, 68.

[27] Brubaker, Rogers and David Laitin. (1998) 'Ethnic and Nationalist Violence', *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 24, pp. 423-52, especially p. 446-7.

representation within, and of each player." Jenne does not dismiss Brubaker's "triadic nexus." Rather, she adds an emphasis on the individual and competing stances within an actor.[28]

2.4. Mobilizing structures: Mobilizing structures can include family networks, voluntary associations, work units, and even parts of the state structure from which mobilization can be generated.[29] The definition can include all formal and informal organizations that facilitate collective action.[30] While certain structures are designed with a specific purpose and goal, others are "pre-existing" structures that meet the everyday needs of its constituents. Of course, the strength of these mobilizing structures has an effect on the end result of a group's goals.[31] I offer the use of mobilizing structures as a variable with the caveat that a mobilizing structure is not a monolithic unit with a clearly defined membership and strategic direction, and is actually composed of multiple components with varying goals.

With regards to ethnicity, I will not portray the Uzbek identity as an unchanging and inflexible identity. Utilizing an objectivist view of identity would require the Uzbeks to be thought of as a monolithic group whose identity has always been definable. This objectivist interpretation would not allow for a discussion of the divisions within what is termed the Uzbek ethnic group, nor would it allow for an analysis of the blurred lines between Uzbeks and other groups, particularly the Tajiks. Also, a strict objectivist interpretation would necessitate ignoring the social changes brought by decades of Russian and then Soviet domination of Uzbeks north of the Amu Darya. Certainly during this time the people known collectively today as Uzbeks in the former Soviet Republics underwent changes that Uzbeks in Afghanistan did not. Instead, a constructivist view of identity will be employed. Citing numerous authors, it will be shown that the Uzbek identity is a very broad term that has never described a cohesive unit. The differences within the group and the unclear divisions between Uzbeks and other groups will also be demonstrated. Additionally, the flexibility and strategic manipulation of Uzbek identity, as employed by leaders and as selectively interpreted by the people, will also be explored. This flexibility determines the scale and type of mobilization, and therefore needs to be discussed at length.

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[28] Jenne (2004), p. 732.

[29] McCarthy, John D. (1996) 'Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing', in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge University Press, p. 141.

[30] McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996), op cit, p. 3.

[31] Rucht, Dieter. (1996) 'The Impact of National Contexts on Social Movement Structures', in McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movement*s. Cambridge University Press, p. 185-6.

2.5. Summary: I consider the four preceding variables as being not just the four most important variables in explaining ethno-political mobilization. I also consider them to be variables that have been thoroughly examined and critiqued, and despite continuing debate about their usefulness they are still the best tools available at this time. Although I believe variables such as framing and agency (leadership skill) are important,[32] I find them nearly impossible to analyze due to the absence of a thorough cultural anthropology and the paucity of relevant sources.

Each of the following sections will analyze a single variable across the two different cases. However, I will not just analyze each variable in isolation. The relationship among the variables and how they affect each other will be examined in the final section of this paper.

3. Credible commitment problems for Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Afghanistan

This section will analyze the credible commitment problem for the Uzbek community in both Afghanistan and Tajikistan. All factors, past and contemporaneous, that contributed to the Uzbek communities feeling threatened will be noted. It will be demonstrated that the Uzbeks in Afghanistan had reason to feel threatened and therefore had motivation to mobilize to protect themselves. In contrast, the Uzbeks in Tajikistan were only seriously threatened in the south while the main Uzbek population in the north faced no comparable threat.

3.1. Tajikistan   3.1.1. Civil War: During the Tajikistan civil war many people were killed because of their region of origin, with the most significant conflict between Tajik regional groups, not between Uzbeks and Tajiks.[33] However, this lack of interethnic conflict was only true for the northern Uzbeks, whose interests were tied in with the Khojent faction, a patronage network consisting of both Tajiks and Uzbeks from the northern Leninabad region.[34] Thanks to

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[32] Benford, Robert and David Snow. (2000) 'Framing Processes and Social Movements', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, pp. 611-39; I also acknowledge here the possibility that the success of Uzbek political and military mobilization in Afghanistan may be owing to the leadership skill of General Rashid Dostum. It may be that without him the Uzbeks in Afghanistan would have had a much lower level of mobilization.

[33] Foroughi, Payam. (2004) 'Nations in Transit 2004: Tajikistan', Freedom House Nations in Transit, p. 380; Rubin, Barnett (1998) 'Russian Hegemony and State Breakdown in the Periphery: Causes and Consequences of the Civil War in Tajikistan', in Rubin and Snyder (eds) *Post- Soviet Political Order*. London: Routledge, p. 128-29.

[34] Gretsky, Sergei. (1995) 'Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Developments, and Prospects for Peace', in Sagdeev and Eisenhower (eds.), *Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution, and Change*. Chevy Chase, MD: CPSS Press, pp. 222-3.

its geographical isolation the north was free of conflict during the civil war.[35] However, for Uzbeks in the south the situation was different. One of the areas of conflict with high casualties was Qurghonteppe, where Gharmi Tajiks and Uzbeks were involved in heavy fighting. In Qurghonteppe during the 1960s the Gharmis and Uzbeks had been involved in disputes over land and water.[36] During the civil war these disputes reappeared due to the collapse of government authority and the shortage of resources caused by the economy's collapse. During the civil war ethnic Uzbeks, as well as anyone from the north, were targeted in Qurghonteppe by opposition forces. Civilians in Qurghonteppe were subjected to rape, beatings, and even execution.[37] By the summer of 1992, approximately 30,000 Uzbek refugees had left Qurghonteppe, mostly for Hissor.[38]

In response to the deteriorating security conditions and increasing violence, numerous armed groups formed, whether for the purpose of protecting their community or for attacking others. The worst of the violence in Qurghonteppe eventually ended after the 1992-93 round of fighting and, in the partial peace settlement of November 1992, the Uzbek population in Qurghonteppe was left under the control of their regional leaders.[39] Another round of large-scale violence occurred in 1997 after an insurrection in Qurghonteppe by Mahmud Khudoberdiev, an ethnic Lakay-Uzbek. Immediately afterwards the Uzbek population of that area suffered reprisal killings, this time by the Kulobi Tajiks who controlled the central government.[40]

3.1.2. Post-Civil War: Tension between Uzbeks and Tajiks remains in the south, particularly in the Tursunzade District and in the Vakhsh Valley.[41] It is in these areas and in other southern districts where the Uzbeks feel vulnerable. This vulnerability is suggested by the movement of

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[35] Niyazi, Aziz. (1998) 'Tajikistan I: The Regional Dimension of Conflict', in Waller, Coppieters and Malashenko (editors), *Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia*. London: Frank Cass, p. 148.

[36] Ibid, p. 161; Roy, Olivier. (2001) 'Inter-regional dynamics of war', in *Politics of Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process*. Kamoludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes (eds.). London: Conciliation Resources.

[37] Shepherd, Monika. (1997b) 'Turf war erupts in Dushanbe, spreads west and south', *The NIS Observed*, (2)15. Online at: www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol2/ed15.html#monika; For violence against an Urghut Uzbek kolkhoz in Qurghonteppe see *Golos Tadzhikistana*, 9/13/92, quoted in Nourzhanov, Kirill. (2005) 'Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan', in *Central Asian Survey*, 24(2), p. 127 footnote 25.

[38] Nourzhanov, Kirill (2005), op cit, p. 116.

[39] Ibid, p. 112, 118.

[40] Human Rights Watch. (1998) 'Leninabad: Crackdown in the North', *Human Rights Watch Report,* Vol. 10, No. 2. (D). Available online at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/tajikistan

[41] International Crisis Group. (2001) 'Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace' *ICG Asia Report*, No. 30. Available online at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1438, p. 1 footnote 3, p. 28; Rowe, Jr., W. (2002) 'On the Edge of Empires', Ph. D. Diss., University of Texas, pp. 146-7, 213; Human Rights Watch (1995), 'Return to Tajikistan', *HRW Report*, 7(9). Online at: www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Tajik.htm

many Uzbeks from Panj to districts with a heavier Uzbek population or to other countries in response to violence against Uzbeks.[42] In the north, however, there is no similar tension between the Uzbeks and Tajiks.[43] An important factor here is that the local economy has brought relative stability. Since the late 1990s, the economy in the northern Sughd (formerly Leninabad) *Oblast* has been improving and, as during the Soviet era, is more prosperous than the south. Without serious economic grievances, the north, including its large Uzbek population, has little economic incentive to confront the center.[44] In particular, the Uzbeks have adapted better to the post-war economic environment, owing to their previous lower level of reliance on the state compared to other groups.[45] Despite local political elites being marginalized by the central government,[46] most Uzbeks since 1994 have supported the incumbent president Rahmonov out of a concern for stability.[47] At a national level anti-Uzbek sentiments are occasionally expressed in Tajikistan.[48] However, this rhetoric is mostly confined to intelligentsia attacking each other. Even amongst this group, anti-Uzbek sentiments have declined since the end of the war.[49]

3.2. Afghanistan   3.2.1. Communal level: Historical Grievances: The Pashtuns have historically dominated Afghanistan and have strongly defended their position against other groups, including the Uzbeks, who the Pashtun rulers oppressed political and socially.[50] Under Amir Abdur Rahman, starting in the 1880s, the Hazarajat, Kafiristan, Herat, the Ghilzai Pashtun territories, Khohistan, and Turkistan were brought under central control by force. Abdur Rahman destroyed many local communities, executed local leaders, confiscated property, and exiled some

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[42] Minorities at Risk. (2003a) 'Assessment for Uzbeks in Tajikistan', Minorities at Risk Project. (December 31, 2003). Available online at: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=70202

[43] International Crisis Group. (2001), op cit, p. 1 footnote 3, p. 28.

[44] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, pp. 94-5.

[45] Ibid, p. 107; Olimov, M.A. and Olimova, Saodat. (2002) 'Ethnic Factors and Local Self-Government in Tajikistan', in Valery Tishkov and Elena Filippova (editors) *Local Governance and Minority Empowerment in the CIS*. Budapest, Hungary: LGI Books, p. 249. For an example of Urghuti Uzbeks in small business see Dudoignon, S. (2004) 'From Ambivalence to Ambiguity? Some Paradigms for Policy Making in Tajikistan', pp. 119-150 in *Tajikistan at a Crossroad*. Situation Report #4, Di Martino (ed). Geneva: Cimera Publications, p. 143-4.

[46] Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, pp. 122-3; Schoeberlein, John. (2002) 'Bones of Contention: Conflicts over Resources', in Mekenkamp, van Tongeren, and van de Veen (eds), *Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 89-90.

[47] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 89.

[48] Foroughi, Payam. (2003) 'Tajikistan', *Freedom House Nations in Transit Report*, p. 586.

[49] Khudonazar, Anaita. (2004) 'The Other', *Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series*, available: http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/publications/2004_05-khud.pdf, p. 22; for a description of Tajik and Uzbek intellectuals attacking each other see Atkin, Muriel. (1992) 'Religious, National and Other Identities in Central Asia', pp. 46-72 in Jo Ann Gross, ed., *Muslims in Central Asia*. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 50-4.

[50] Rais, Rasul B. (1999) 'Conflict in Afghanistan', *Ethnic Studies Report*, 17(1), p. 5; Dupree, Louis. (1973) *Afghanistan*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 161.

of the local population.[51] Throughout the north Abdur Rahman subjugated the Uzbeks and others by the use of "violence and torture."[52] As late as the 1930s, the central government engaged in significant military campaigns. In 1930-31 the Afghan government sent thousands of Pashtun militiamen to the north to fight the Central Asian exiles and their local supporters. During these campaigns many Uzbeks and Tajiks were killed and/or had their communities looted.[53]

Almost every Afghan ruler until 1979 had a policy of attempting to "homogenize" the peoples of Afghanistan. In a process referred to as "Pashtunization" the Afghan government used Pashtun nationalist ideology, land redistribution and forced resettlement that favored the Pashtuns, as well as excessive taxation and racially motivated undercounts of the non-Pashtuns.[54] Furthermore, only Durrani Pashtuns received significant appointments in the military and government.[55] Some Pashtuns have justified the policies of Pashtunization by claiming that they are the original inhabitants of all of Afghanistan and that Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and others are "intruders" who forced Pashtuns out.[56] The Durrani in particular claim their right to political, economic, and religious dominance based on their perceived superiority.[57] Because of these policies the minorities of Afghanistan became resentful of the historical Pashtun dominance.[58] This is especially true of the educated class among the minorities, particularly the Uzbeks.[59]

Pashtunization: Before Abdur Rahman consolidated his rule over northern Afghanistan in the 1880s the steppes and the foothills throughout Turkistan[60] were politically and

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[51] Kakar, Hasan Kawun. (1979) *Government and Society in Afghanistan.* Austin: University of Texas Press, p. 10.

[52] Shahrani, M. Nazif. (2002) 'War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan'*, American Anthropologist*, Vol. 104, No. 3, p. 718; Shahrani, M. Nazif (1979) 'Ethnic Relations under Closed Frontier Conditions: Northeast Badakhshan' in McCagg, Jr. and Silver (editors) *Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers.* New York: Pergamon Press, p. 174.

[53] Shahrani (2001a), op cit, p. 5.

[54] Schetter, Conrad. (2005) 'Ethnoscapes, National Territorialisation, and the Afghan War', *Geopolitics*, Volume 10, p. 58; Shahrani, M. Nazif. (2001a) 'Resisting the Taliban and Talibanism in Afghanistan', *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 5, Number 4, p. 8.

[55] Simonsen, Sven Gunnar. (2004) 'Ethnicising Afghanistan?', *Third World Quarterly,* 25(4), p. 710; Goodson, Larry. (2003) 'Afghanistan's Long Road to Reconstruction', *Journal of Democracy,* 14(1), p. 87.

[56] Grevemeyer, J.-H. (1987) *Afghanistan: Sozial Wandel und Staat im 20 Jahrhundert.* Berlin: Express Edition, pp. 144-5; for the claim that Pashtuns dominated the north demographically see Kakar (1979), op cit.

[57] Tapper, N. (1991), op cit, pp. 38-41. Louis Dupree described a social hierarchy that placed Pashtuns at the top, followed by Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and finally the Hazara at the very bottom. See: Dupree (1973), op cit, p. 161.

[58] Goodson, Larry. (1998) 'The Fragmentation of Culture in Afghanistan', *Alif*, 18, p. 271; Goodson, Larry. (2001) *Afghanistan's Endless War.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, p. 16.

[59] Hyman, Anthony. (2002) 'Nationalism in Afghanistan', *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 34, p. 300; Griffiths, John C. (1981) *Afghanistan: Key to a Continent.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 87-8.

[60] Turkistan is the historical name for northern Afghanistan.

demographically dominated by Uzbeks, especially in the areas now called Jauzjan and Faryab, but also in the Kunduz region as well, where Uzbeks had dominated since the 16th century.[61] Before the 1880s and 1890s the Pashtun population in northern Afghanistan was very small and insignificant.[62] A British census from 1884 in Turkistan shows that, out of 87,105 families, 30,080 were Uzbek and only 3,420 were "Afghan" (Pashtun).[63] Most importantly for Uzbeks, the political authority in these areas was not the Afghan government but instead the local semi-independent khanates.[64] However, Abdur Rahman was able to consolidate his rule and control the non-Pashtuns in the north through Pashtunization, a form of internal colonialism. Through this policy the Uzbeks, Turkmen and Tajiks in the north lost their best lands to Pashtun settlers.[65] Rahman's motivation for this policy was to populate the northern areas with his presumably more loyal Pashtun co-ethnics. This would bring economic gain to the central government as well as help to defend against invasions from the north. However, Pashtunization was also a tool to exile Rahman's political opponents from other Pashtun tribes.[66] Before 1885 all Pashtuns migrating to the north did so involuntarily and usually as punishment for opposing state policies. After 1885 Rahman introduced voluntary migration by offering financial and social incentives for Pashtun settlers, though deportations of Pashtuns to the north continued after 1885.[67]

Pashtunization continued into the twentieth century with the arrival of Pashtun herders in the north during the 1910s through 1940s. Their arrival and their use of the land displaced many Uzbeks and Tajiks, disrupting the local ethnic balance and causing resentment.[68] Nazif Shahrani states that from the 1930s into the 1970s Uzbeks and Tajiks lost hundreds of thousands of acres

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[61] Tapper, Richard. (1984) 'Ethnicity and Class: Dimensions of Conflict', in Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan. Shahrani and Canfield (Eds.) Berkeley: University of California, p. 244; Tapper, Nancy. (1991) Bartered Brides: Politics, Gender and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society. Cambridge University Press, p. 26; Azoy, Whitney. (1982) Buzkashi: Game and Power in Afghanistan. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 73. For a map of the where Uzbeks predominate see www.nationalgeographic.com/landincrisis/ethnic.html

[62] Shahrani, M. Nazif. (1998) 'The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governance in Afghanistan', in Maley (ed.) *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*. NY: NYU Press, p. 221 note 14.

[63] Adamec quoted in Barfield, Thomas. (1981) *The Central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan*. University of Texas, p. 16.

[64] Tapper, R. (1984), op cit, p. 233.

[65] Hyman (2002), op cit, pp. 306-7.

[66] Tapper, R. (1984), op cit, p. 235.

[67] Tapper, Nancy. (1983) 'Abd Al-Rahman's North-West Frontier: The Pashtun Colonisation of Afghan Turkistan', in *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*. Richard Tapper (Ed.) NY: St. Martin's Press, p. 238-9.

[68] Shahrani (1979), op cit, p. 180.

of cultivated land and pasture, land which was then given to Pashtun settlers.[69] This produced conflicts when, beginning in the 1950s, land became increasingly scarce.[70] The competition over resources resulted in a political alignment between Pashtuns and all others in the north referred to by the locals as *Afghaniyya* versus *Uzbekiyya*.[71] The cleavage between Pashtuns and all others in the north was also a national issue, since many of the Pashtuns in the north could be considered representatives of the central government that supported them.[72]

Pashtunization's land policies were not the sole reason for Uzbek resentment against the Pashtuns and the government. Uzbek refugees from Central Asia, who arrived after the greatest effects of Pashtunization, and who had not lost land, also became hostile towards the Pashtuns in the north because of the way the Pashtuns dominated politics and the economy. According to Shalinsky, the result in this refugee community was the "development of [an] Uzbek nationalist feeling," particularly among the young males who had been born and raised in Afghanistan.[73]

Soviet-Afghan War Era: As the fight against the Soviet troops and the communist government progressed, the mujahideen parties slowly lost their ideological characteristics and eventually took on the appearance of "tribal, regional, and ethnolinguistic forces."[74] The non-Pashtuns of Afghanistan framed their political mobilization from this point onward with ethnic grievances.[75] For example, the Uzbek militia leader Rashid Dostum said in early 1990 that Uzbeks would not return to a system with the Pashtuns in power.[76] Meanwhile, many Pashtun leaders in both the mujahideen and government, who wanted to reassert the historical Pashtun dominance, feared attempts by the northern nationalities to seize power in Kabul. Hizb-i Islami leader Hekmatyar was particularly active in exploiting and aggravating Pashtun fears.[77]

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[69] Shahrani (2001a), op cit, pp. 5-6; for example of lands being sold to Pashtuns see N. Dupree quoted in Shalinsky, Audrey. (1982) 'Islam and Ethnicity: The Northern Afghan Perspective', *Central Asian Survey,* 1(2/3), p. 79. Some of those who lost land then had no choice but to work on their former land for Pashtun landlords.

[70] Barfield, Thomas. (1981) *The Central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan.* Austin: University of Texas Press, pp. 30-1.

[71] Tapper, N. (1991), op cit, p. 29.

[72] Shahrani (1979), op cit, p. 183.

[73] Shalinsky (1982), op cit, pp. 71, 79.

[74] Shahrani (2002), op cit, p. 715.

[75] Maley, William. (1998) 'Interpreting the Taliban', in William Maley (editor) *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban.* New York: New York University Press, p. 7.

[76] Saikal, Amin. (2004) *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival.* London: I. B. Tauris, p. 206; Khashimbekov, Kh. (1994) *Uzbeki Severnogo Afganistana.* Moscow: RAN, p. 38.

[77] Barnett Rubin quoted in Saikal (2004), op cit, p. 207; Roy, Olivier. (1989) 'Afghanistan: back to tribalism or on to Lebanon?' *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 10, No. 4, p. 76.

Post-Communist Era: After the mujahideen and Dostum's forces removed the communist government from power, the mujahideen turned against Dostum and, even in opposition to Pakistani pressure, squeezed Dostum out of the power-sharing agreements of April 1992 and early 1993.[78] In response, Dostum threatened to create a secular republic in the north, an area he mostly controlled. Finally, in early 1994, Dostum joined Hekmatyar and the Hazara leader Mazari in attacking Kabul to stop the consolidation of state power by the Tajik leaders Rabbani and Massoud. At the time, Dostum publicly stated that he was doing this "to change the political system and make it accessible for all national minorities."[79]

Taliban Era: After several years of rule in Kabul by a Tajik-dominated government many Pashtuns wanted to reassert their dominance and joined the Taliban in an effort to achieve this.[80] However, the non-Pashtuns, including the Uzbeks, would not easily accept the conditions that they recently lived under.[81] Along with other minority nationalities, the Uzbeks did not want to exchange the rule of their own leaders (despite their shortcomings) for the rule of the Taliban, who they viewed as religious extremists seeking to reassert Pashtun dominance.[82] The historical memory of oppression and violence perpetrated by the Afghan state gave the non-Pashtun population a strong motivation to resist the Taliban attempts to return the country to Pashtun domination.[83] The Uzbeks, along with the Hazaras, were determined to retain regional autonomy and oppose the re-imposition of central authority, as opposed to the Pashtun Taliban and Ahmed Shah Massoud's Tajik faction, both of whom wanted a strong central government.[84]

Some analysts claim that the violence during the civil war produced stronger ethnic cleavages in Afghanistan. Among these is Larry Goodson, who notes that ethnic cleavages have further hardened because of the Taliban's occupation of the north and the violence committed

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[78] Magnus, Ralph and Eden Naby (1995) 'Afghanistan and Central Asia', *Asian Survey,* 35(7), pp. 616, 618.

[79] Ibid, pp. 215-6.

[80] Hyman (2002), op cit, p. 312; Roy (1998), op cit, p. 208; Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 35. However, support for the Taliban sometimes came in the form of cautious toleration by Pashtun nationalists rather than direct support. See Rais (1999), op cit, p. 3. Eventually most Pashtun commanders, including the northern Pashtun leaders, joined the Taliban. See Shahrani (1998), op cit, p. 226 footnote 25; Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 62; Roy (1998), op cit, p. 208.

[81] Magnus, Ralph and Eden Naby. (1998) *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid.* Boulder: Westview, p. 23.

[82] Rieck, Andreas. (1997) 'Afghanistan's Taliban: An Islamic Revolution of the Pashtuns' in *Orient,* Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 139, 141; Goodson (2003), op cit, p. 87; Saikal, Amin. (1998a) 'The Rabbani Government, 1992-1996', in William Maley (Ed.) *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban.* New York: NYU Press, p. 43.

[83] Shahrani (2001a), op cit, p. 8.

[84] Shahrani (1998), op cit, p. 233.

against the ethnic groups there.[85] Ahmed Rashid agrees, claiming that the Taliban campaign in the north against the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras led to a further strengthening of ethnic divisions and animosities.[86] Rashid notes that the civil war had

> […] divided Islamic sects and ethnic groups in a way that before was unimaginable to ordinary Afghans … [The numerous massacres] has no precedent in [recent] Afghan history and perhaps has irreparably damaged the fabric of the country's national and religious soul.[87]

During their rule the Taliban viewed the minority nationalities as untrustworthy and as probable supporters of rival factions. This is evident in the fact that most people detained and tortured by the Taliban were minorities, and that during the northern campaigns Taliban soldiers targeted and killed Uzbeks in what UN investigators say were ethnically motivated actions.[88] For example, the Uzbek-dominated province of Faryab in particular was subjected to a high level of violence when the Taliban advanced through it in 1998.[89] Throughout the year both sides committed atrocities; Uzbek and Hazara soldiers killed Taliban prisoners and Pashtun villagers in the north and near Kabul during an offensive, and along the route of the Taliban advance Uzbek and Tajik civilians were targeted for theft, rape and murder.[90] In August the Taliban entered Mazar-i Sharif and took revenge for their heavy losses there the previous year. In Mazar the Taliban raped and murdered thousands of civilians, with the Hazaras being specifically targeted, but with Tajiks and Uzbeks also being victimized.[91]

In late 2001 Conrad Schetter argued that while the war had eventually become "ethnicized," the people of Afghanistan had not. He says that ethnicity was not the cause of the war, but was rather the result of the political and military mobilization. He further claimed that the issue of ethnicity is not of much importance to them, and that family, clan, village, and

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[85] Goodson (2003), op cit, p. 90.

[86] Rashid (2000a), op cit, pp. 73-4

[87] Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 83.

[88] Marsden (2001), op cit, p. 23; Maley (1998), op cit, p. 12.

[89] Early in the year the Taliban killed 600 Uzbek villagers. See: Rashid, Ahmed. (2000a) *Taliban.* Yale University Press, p. 70. In July the Taliban captured the city of Maimana along with 800 Uzbek soldiers, most of whom were executed, probably in revenge for Malik Pahlavan's treatment of Taliban prisoners the previous year. See: Ibid, pp. 72-3; Rasanayagam, Angelo. (2003) *Afghanistan: A Modern History.* London: I. B. Tauris, pp. 156-7.

[90] Rashid (2000a), op cit, pp. 63-4; Goodson (2001), op cit, pp. 86, 132.

[91] Department of State. (1999) 'Afghanistan: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999', US Department of State. Available online at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/431.htm. The Taliban commanders claimed that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar had given them permission to take revenge and carry out massacre for two hours in Mazar. The commanders stretched this time period to two days. See: Goodson (2001), op cit, pp. 86, 132.

region continue to be the most important sources of their identity.[92] Schetter blames the most recent ethnic factionalization and conflict on certain leaders, particularly "ethnic entrepreneurs" such as Dostum, Massoud, and the Hazara leader Khalili who represented themselves as leaders of their ethnic groups to mobilize support and troops.[93] Their tactic was to exacerbate anxiety about the survival of their own ethnic group in order to gain support.[94]

Bernt Glatzer argued in 1998 that to call the civil war in Afghanistan an ethnic conflict was only partially true and "of little help in evaluating the present situation in Afghanistan," even if the Taliban had polarized the country between the Pashtun south and the center and north, where Pashtuns were a minority, and even if the different factions were all dominated by one ethnic group. Glatzer identifies Hizb-i Wahdat as the only faction that truly represented an entire ethnic group (the Hazaras).[95] He says that the various groups have been fighting for their local autonomy, not the break-up of Afghanistan.[96]

While Schetter and Glatzer make valid arguments against analyzing the Afghan conflict as strictly an ethnic war, there was definitely enough historical oppression of Uzbeks and a serious enough threat to the Uzbek community during the rise of the Taliban for Uzbeks, at the communal level, to see the logic in violently resisting the Pashtun Taliban. The facts presented in this section clearly demonstrate that the credible commitment problem was important for the Uzbeks of Afghanistan and that it is reasonable to conclude that they believed the new rise of Pashtun domination was a threat to the continued prosperity and survival of their community.

3.2.2. Elite Level: The Taliban actions indicated that any person who had collaborated with the communists would not only be excluded from government, but would probably be executed.[97] As early as 1995 it was apparent that any leader, former communist or not, who opposed the Taliban would not be shown mercy. Thus, for example, after being captured, or possibly

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[92] Schetter, Conrad. (2001) 'The Chimera of Ethnicity in Afghanistan', *Die Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, accessed on 11/22/04 at: www.nzz.ch/english/background/2001/10/31_Afghanistan.html

[93] Schetter (2001), op cit.

[94] Schetter, Conrad. (2003) 'Ethnicity and Political Reconstruction in Afghanistan', Paper presented at the symposium: State Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan, London School of Economics, 30 May – 1 June 2003. Available online at: www.ag-afghanistan.de/arg/arp/schetter.pdf, p. 4.

[95] Glatzer, Bernt. (1998) 'Is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic and Tribal Disintegration?', in William Maley (editor) *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban.* New York: New York University Press, p. 169-172.

[96] Maley (1998), op cit, p. 26.

[97] Rais, Rasul Bakhsh. (1999) 'Conflict in Afghanistan', *Ethnic Studies Report*, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 4.

surrendering, the Hazara Shia leader Mazari was killed while in the custody of the Taliban.[98] From the beginning the Taliban's rhetoric framed the communists and mujahideen as "criminals" and "usurpers" who had "destroyed Afghanistan."[99] In 1996 the Taliban announced an amnesty for lower level civil and military officials, but explicitly ruled out any amnesty for the leaders of the various factions "whose hands were red with the blood of Afghan Muslims."[100] One month later it was clear that Dostum was considered by the Taliban to be one of these leaders when he was named specifically as the target of Jihad.[101] However, Dostum was already wary of the Taliban because of their execution of the former communist leader Najibullah when they captured Kabul. This had a strong effect on Dostum, as it foreshadowed what could be his fate if he surrendered to or was captured by the Taliban.[102] The Taliban confirmed suspicions when they issued death sentences on Massoud, Rabbani, and Dostum.[103]

Pakistan's leadership hoped to have Dostum remain in control over the north, with minimal Taliban authority over the area, in order to placate Russia and the Central Asian states.[104] However, Pakistan's attempts in 1995 and 1996 to persuade their Taliban clients to allow Dostum his continued autonomy in the north were a failure, as the Taliban refused any suggestion of relinquishing any power anywhere in the country.[105] On Dostum's part, the lack of willingness to negotiate stemmed from the Taliban's execution of Najibullah.[106] As a result, Dostum joined Massoud, Rabbani, Khalili, and others in an anti-Taliban alliance known in the Western media as the Northern Alliance.[107] However, one Uzbek leader, Dostum's second-in-command Abdul Malik, was persuaded to cooperate with the Taliban, after receiving strong guarantees from Pakistan.[108] The Taliban promised to put Malik in power in the north in return for his cooperation.[109] This agreement was never implemented, however, because the Taliban

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[98] Marsden (2001), op cit, p. 23; Saikal (1998a), op cit, p. 34.

[99] Rieck (1997), op cit, p. 132.

[100] *The News*, 27 September 1996, quoted in Rieck (1997), op cit, p. 136.

[101] *The Nation*, 30 October 1996, quoted in Rieck (1997), op cit, p. 137.

[102] Rieck (1997), op cit, p. 137; Sreedhar et al. (1998) *Afghan Turmoil*. New Delhi: Himalayan Books, p. 59.

[103] Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 50.

[104] Maley (1998), op cit, pp. 10-1.

[105] Rashid, Ahmed. (1998) 'Pakistan and the Taliban', in Maley (ed) *Fundamentalism Reborn?* NYU Press, p. 82.

[106] Maley (1998), op cit, pp. 10-1.

[107] Rashid (2000a), op cit, pp. 52-3; Sreedhar, Mahendra and Ved (1998), op cit, p. 59.

[108] Saikal (1998b), op cit, p. 120; Maley (1998), op cit, p. 11. Abdul Malik is sometimes referred to as Abdul Malik Pahlavan.

[109] Rasanayagam (2003), op cit, p. 153.

reneged on their agreement almost immediately.[110] They refused to share power with Malik and instead attempted to assign him the minor post of Deputy Foreign Minister. The Taliban did all this despite Pakistani attempts to persuade them to at least renegotiate, if not honor, their agreement. The result for Malik was the destruction of his forces and exile in Iran.[111] This incident, along with the death of Mazari and the execution of Najibullah, was an obvious final warning to any leader who thought he could negotiate favorable terms with the Taliban.

4. Political opportunity for Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Afghanistan

The opportunity for the Uzbeks to mobilize during both the Afghan and Tajik civil wars will be the main focus of this section. However, the opportunity to mobilize in the past will also be discussed. Here I define political opportunity as the collapse of governance and central authority and the temporary absence of any force that could impose its will on the Uzbek communities during both wars.

4.1. Tajikistan   4.1.1. Soviet era: The Soviet government consolidated control over the area of present day Tajikistan by 1929 when they defeated the last *basmachi* revolt, a series of uprisings that began in 1918 in response to the Soviet offensive and then later against Bolshevik reforms.[112] The following Soviet era, from the last *basmachi* revolt until the late 1980s, was mostly peaceful. However, some groups, such as the Lakay Uzbeks, continued to be confrontational with the state. The government defeated the last large Lakay uprising in the 1960s by both the use of force and by offering concessions to the Lakay community.[113]

During the communist era the Soviets maintained control at a national level over the distribution of resources and the promotion of cadres. However, the government left the rural areas "under-administered," with the Soviet security apparatus and central government representatives almost non-existent outside the cities. In the rural areas the government allowed local leaders to be the middlemen between the people and the state. This allowed local leaders to maintain their own power bases, leaders who Olivier Roy calls the "new *beys* and *khan*s." The

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[110] Saikal (1998b), op cit, p. 120.
[111] Rashid (2000a), op cit, pp. 58, 62.
[112] Roy, Olivier. (2000) *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations.* New York: NYU Press, pp. 46-9.
[113] Olimov and Olimova (2002), op cit, p. 257.

government did not destroy the pre-existing solidarity groups (*qawm*, *avlod*, *mahalla*, or other types of solidarity groups). Instead it often formed collective farms (*kolkhozes*) from some of these groups, allowing their structure to remain intact throughout the Soviet era.[114] There was an attempt by the Soviets to break apart these traditional solidarity groupings, starting in the mid-1950s, when the state restructured the *kolkhoz*. At this time to government started to appoint the head of the *kolkhoz* and to consolidate multiple *kolkhozes* into one *sovkhoz*. These changes, however, did not destroy the solidarity groups, which often remained intact. Sometimes, the *kolkhoz* itself became a new solidarity group. In either case, according to Roy, relatively autonomous communities persisted. Eventually the Communist Party settled on a policy of manipulating existing regional factions against each other instead of trying to reconfigure them.[115]

4.1.2. Independence and Civil War: Starting in 1990, the capabilities and power of the government in Tajikistan rapidly deteriorated, with different parts of the state apparatus divided between the different regional factions.[116] After the collapse of the Soviet Union the central government in Tajikistan became even weaker, deprived of the perception of control and order in the eyes of its population. Furthermore, it was now facing political opposition from various groups.[117] Despite the Tajik Communist Party's attempt in 1991 to create a strongly centralized and authoritarian government, by spring 1992 the country was divided among various regional factions and the central government was completely ineffective.[118] Due to the government's weakness, President Nabiev was forced to concede to power sharing with the opposition after they organized large protests in the capital. However, the Leninabad and Kulob factions, who were the powers behind the government, rejected this power sharing arrangement. The Kulobi forces then mobilized to seize power. The country fell into a civil war as regional commanders quickly moved to fill the void created by the collapse of government authority.[119]

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[114] Roy (2000), op cit, pp. 85-9, 106.
[115] Ibid, pp. 88-9, 102-5.
[116] Niyazi (1998), op cit, p. 146; Roy, Olivier. (1997) 'Is the Conflict in Tajikistan a Model for Conflicts Throughout Central Asia?', in *Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence*. Djalili, Grare and Akiner (eds.), New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 146.
[117] Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, p. 111; Menon, Rajan and H. Spruyt. (1998) 'Possibilities for Conflict resolution in Post-Soviet Central Asia', in Rubin and Snyder (eds) *Post-Soviet Political Order*. London: Routledge, p. 113.
[118] Horowitz, Shale. (2001) 'Explaining Post-Soviet Ethnic Conflicts: Using Regime Type to Discern the Impact and Relative Importance of Objective Antecedents' in *Nationalities Papers,* Vol. 29, No. 4, p. 651; Niyazi (1998), op cit, p. 146.
[119] Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, p. 117; Horowitz (2001), op cit, p. 651.

The city of Khojent and the surrounding northern Leninabad (Sughd) *Oblast*,[120] with half of Tajikistan's economy,[121] were spared the military conflict of 1992-93. This was above all thanks to its geographic isolation, with only one road fully within the country connecting Leninabad to the capital Dushanbe and the rest of Tajikistan over the Anzob pass on the Zerafshan mountain range, a road that is only open for several months out of the year due to snow. The Khojentis further isolated themselves in May 1992 when they blockaded the Anzob pass.[122] Later, when President Rahmonov attempted to move Kulobi forces into Leninabad, the Khojenti leader destroyed the only bridge connecting the north to Dushanbe.[123]

As part of a partial peace settlement that was reached in November 1992 the southern Uzbek population in Qurghonteppe was left under the control of their regional leaders.[124] Although by early 1993 the worst of the fighting had ceased, the Kulobi faction did attempt to disarm the Uzbek forces in Qurghonteppe as part of their power consolidation, which also included the purging of Khojentis from government.[125]

In 1994 Tajikistan held presidential elections that Human Rights Watch called "tainted by intimidation and slanted news coverage." OSCE[126] declined even to send monitors, rejecting the election results in advance. President Rahmonov, the Kulobi, won the election with 60% of the votes; the loser was the Khojenti candidate Abdullajanov, the only other candidate permitted to run.[127] Despite Rahmonov's victory, the central government was unable at this time to control Leninabad *Oblast*.[128] Eventually, starting in 1995, the Kulobis were able to appoint their followers to high-level positions in Khojent.[129] But even with these central government gains, Tajikistan in 1997 was a state with a central government that could exercise very little authority. Instead, regional commanders and criminal groups held power throughout the country.[130]

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[120] Administrative region within a Soviet Republic. The term is still in use in Tajikistan.

[121] Schoeberlein, John. (2002) 'Bones of Contention: Conflicts over Resources', in Mekenkamp, van Tongeren, and van de Veen (editors), *Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 88.

[122] Niyazi (1998), op cit, p. 148; Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 47. A connecting tunnel has now been built; Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, p. 112; Roy (1997), op cit, p. 132; Gretsky (1995), op cit, p. 220.

[123] Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, p. 122.

[124] Ibid, p. 118.

[125] International Crisis Group (2001), op cit, p. 2; Horowitz (2001), op cit, p. 652.

[126] The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[127] Atkin, Muriel. (1997) 'Tajikistan: reform, reaction, and civil war', in *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*. Ian Bremer and Ray Taras (editors), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 613-4.

[128] Akbarzadeh, Shahram. (1996) 'Why Did Nationalism Fail in Tajikistan?', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48(7), p. 1117.

[129] Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, pp. 122-3.

[130] International Crisis Group. (2001), op cit, p. 3.

4.1.3. Post-Civil War: In the years after the final civil war settlement of June 1997 the government made progress in building a functioning state, although the central government during this time was not able to act unilaterally. Instead it had to consider the interests of various factions, business and criminal interests, as well as armed commanders.[131] In maintaining security and sovereignty the central government was relatively weak. A good example of this weakness is the 1998 incursion of the Lakay Uzbek commander Khudoberdiev into Leninabad that was defeated only with the help of United Tajik Opposition (UTO) forces.[132] The previous year Khudoberdiev had been able to make the government concede to several of his demands after his forces took over the Tursunzade aluminum plant from a presidential ally.[133]

Rahmonov continually consolidated power and marginalized any source of opposition. In 1999 and 2000 he easily won presidential and parliamentary elections that international observers called unfair.[134] Uzbeks were unable to form a party to represent their interests since political parties based on ethnicity are illegal in Tajikistan. Even regional parties are unable to form, as parties must have representation in all four provinces of the country.[135]

Khojent and Sughd *Oblast* now face increasing control over their economy by the Kulob faction that holds power in Dushanbe. Furthermore, the Khojentis are steadily losing their positions both within the central government and at the local level. For example, Sughd governor Kazim Kazimov, who replaced the ethnic Uzbek governor Khamidov in 1996, is considered to be a Rahmonov ally.[136]

According to several analysts, despite gains by the central government the state was still weak in 2004. Rahmonov was still relying on the poorly trained and equipped security forces to maintain power, rather than through civilian governance. Furthermore, the regional and clan networks were still operating independently of the central government.[137] Nevertheless, since the

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[131] Ibid.
[132] Foroughi (2004), op cit, p. 6.
[133] Naumkin, Vitaly V. (2003) 'Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan', Berkeley program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Spring 2003. Available online at: http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/publications/2003_06-naum.pdf, p. 28.
[134] International Crisis Group (2001), op cit, p. 3.
[135] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 200.
[136] Schoeberlein (2002), p. 89-90; International Crisis Group (2001), op cit, pp. 5, 13.
[137] Foroughi (2004), op cit, pp. 11-2; Olimova, Saodat. (2004a) 'Regionalism and its perception by major political and social powers of Tajikistan', pp. 85-118 in *Tajikistan at a Crossroad: The Politics of Decentralization*. Di Martino (ed). Geneva: Cimera, p. 99. In 2004 Saodat Olimova claimed that the central government still has no control over the regional economies. See: Olimova (2004a), op cit, p.118.

mid-1990s the opportunity for the regional elites to mobilize and make concessions from the government has become very restricted.[138]

4.2. Afghanistan   4.2.1. Pre-1978: Never in its history has an Afghan government exercised full sovereignty over its territory. Since politics in Afghanistan have been mostly relevant at the local level, most Afghans have been unconcerned about national-level politics.[139] Shahrani describes the relationship between the central government and the regions before the 1890s, when Abdur Rahman was able to consolidate his rule, as "[...] more a matter of political stalemate than of active administrative control by a central authority."[140]

Before the communist takeover in Afghanistan the central government did not have an effective system of rule outside the urban areas. Instead it tried to co-opt the existing local institutions into an administrative structure.[141] Olivier Roy notes how, with the ascension of Abdur Rahman to power, "[…] the state was able to cover the whole country with a light but unchallenged system of administrative and military outposts."[142] However, without sufficient military, political and financial resources the Afghan government was unable to build a strong state. Although the central government sent its representatives to the countryside, all the way down to the sub-district level, these representatives were unable to govern since they did not have the power and influence held by local and regional leaders.[143] Instead the central government would secure the cooperation of the local leaders by distributing resources to them.[144] As the central government steadily gained control over the country in the 20th century

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[138] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 253.

[139] Radnitz, Scott. (2004) 'Working with the Warlords: Designing an Ethnofederal System for Afghanistan', *Regional and Federal Studies,* 14(4), p. 513; Thier, A., and J. Chopra. (2002) 'Considerations for Political and Institutional Reconstruction in Afghanistan', *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, (January). Online at: www.jha.ac/articles/a090.pdf, p. 15; Ollapally, Deepa. (ed) (2003) 'Unfinished Business in Afghanistan', *USIP Special Report,* 105. Online: www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr105.pdf, p. 1.

[140] Shahrani (1979), op cit, p. 178. Such state weakness allowed Murad Beg, an Uzbek Khan, to rule Afghan Turkistan from 1815 to 1840.

[141] Rubin, Barnett R. (1995a) *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan*. Yale University Press, pp. 22-3; Wimmer, Andreas and Conrad Schetter. (2003) 'Putting State-Formation First', *Journal of Int'l Development*, Vol. 15, p. 528.

[142] Roy, Olivier. (2002) 'Afghanistan: Internal Politics and Socio-Economic Dynamics and Groupings', *WRITENET Paper* No. 14. www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RSDCOI&id=3e9ae5535&page=publ, p. 2.

[143] Wimmer and Schetter (2003), op cit, p. 528.

[144] Ibid; Rubin (1995a), op cit, p. 23; Dorronsoro, Gilles. (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present.* New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 24-5.

the increasing power of the central government may have been less relevant for the Uzbeks since, thanks to their "economic self-sufficiency," their regions had significant autonomy.[145]

4.2.2. Soviet occupation through the Taliban era

According to Larry Goodson the Soviet-Afghan war resulted in an environment where

[...] social and political institutions were destroyed or irrevocably altered, especially the government institutions, armed forces, political parties, universities, religious hierarchy, and media. Likewise, the power groups did not survive the war unaffected, including the landed elite (khans), urban capitalists, military officers, intelligentsia, ulama, and tribal leaders. The entire network of Afghan society was affected.[146]

The destruction of the political system that had existed before the Soviet invasion resulted in a "power vacuum" where new leaders could emerge to take the place of the pre-war elites.[147] The decline of Pashtun-dominated governance in Afghanistan resulted in "unprecedented" opportunities for minorities, including Turkic peoples, to express their political views and to organize militarily.[148] Before 1978 the authoritarian nature of the Afghan government did not allow for "political expressions of ethnicity" while "[...] grievances, demands, and legitimate aspirations of the various minority ethnic groups remained under control."[149]

By the late 1980s Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks had full political and administrative autonomy.[150] During this time the Uzbek and Ismaili government militias, who had developed patronage networks to secure the support of local commanders, dominated most of the north.[151] This type of government reliance on ethnic militias, as opposed to the regular army, eroded the Afghan state's "monopoly of power."[152] The communist government offered a high level of local autonomy and large amounts of arms and money to the ethnic militias to secure their

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[145] Minorities at Risk (2003b) 'Assessment for Uzbeks in Afghanistan', MAR Project, 12/31/03. Online: www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=70004. However, the power of the regional and local leaders did have limitations. By the 1970s only the Pashtuns of the border region with Pakistan were involved in any violent resistance against the state. See: Schetter, C. (2002) 'The 'Bazaar Economy' of Afghanistan', in Noelle-Karimi, Schetter and Schlagintweit (eds.) *Afghanistan - A Country without a State?* IKO, p. 111. By comparison Afghan Uzbeks were described as "relatively docile citizens" pre-1978, see: Glatzer (1998), op cit, p. 172.

[146] Goodson (1998), op cit, p. 275.

[147] Goodson (1998), op cit, p. 281; Roy (1989), op cit, p. 73.

[148] Shahrani (2001a), op cit, p. 5.

[149] Rais (1999), op cit, p. 2.

[150] Ibid.

[151] Rubin (1995a), op cit, p. 119.

[152] Wimmer and Schetter (2003), op cit, pp. 528-9; see also Dorronsoro (2005), op cit, p. 206.

continuing cooperation in the fight against the mujahideen. As part of this strategy the Soviet government created development projects to reward the Uzbeks.[153]

Finally, by early 1992, the central government barely existed as a relevant force in the country. The Afghan government and the army were disintegrating while regional governors, militia leaders, and local commanders were forming autonomous regions. At the end of the conflict the Afghan communist government had lost its sources of power; the army was disintegrating, the state administration was collapsing, and the end of Soviet subsidies destroyed the government's system of securing loyalty in the rural areas by distributing resources. Local and regional forces, along with the ethnic government militias, became the new centers of power.[154] The collapse of the Najibullah government in April 1992 ended the Pashtun dominance of Afghanistan, at least until the rise of the Taliban, and completely destroyed the central government's authority.[155] This allowed leaders such as Rashid Dostum to hold power over large areas of the country.[156] Dostum's area of control in the northwest had commercial relations with Central Asia, functioning schools, as well as thriving local media.[157] Before the Taliban invaded, the north was mostly unaffected by the civil war.[158]

5. External support for Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Afghanistan

This section will analyze the level of external support that Uzbek factions or leaders received during the Tajik and Afghan civil wars. I will show that continued financial and military aid from foreign sources in a resource-poor environment is essential for the survival of a faction or leader during a time of conflict. The reasons why the Afghan Uzbek leader Dostum received assistance from various foreign sponsors, as well as the motivations behind the support, will be discussed in detail. The lack of any clear and consistent support for an Uzbek faction or leader in Tajikistan will also be analyzed.

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[153] Rasanayagam (2003), op cit, p. 129; Rais (1999), op cit, p. 2.
[154] Goodson (2003), op cit, pp. 84-5.
[155] Ahady, Anwar-ul-Haq. (1995) 'The Decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan', Asian *Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 7; Misra, Amalendu. (2004) *Afghanistan: The Labyrinth of Violence*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 52.
[156] By 1992 Dostum's domain included the provinces of Jauzjan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Samangan, and parts of Kunduz. See: Saikal (2004), op cit, pp. 206-7.
[157] Shahrani (2002), op cit, p. 719
[158] Rasanayagam (2003), op cit, p. 154; Williams, Brian Glyn. (2003) 'Rashid Dostum: America's Secular Ally in the War on Terror', *Terrorism Monitor*, 1(6). Available: jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=23396

5.1. Tajikistan   **5.1.1. Support from Uzbekistan:** There are several reasons why Uzbekistan supported the Popular Front, which included both the southern and northern Uzbeks of Tajikistan. One is that President Karimov was concerned about Islamist activity within Uzbekistan and did not want to see an Islamist party in power in a neighboring country.[159] Another reason is that the example of a post-Soviet government being defeated by a coalition of opposition forces could encourage political dissent and mobilization at home.[160] Furthermore, according to Barnett Rubin, Karimov may have been worried about the presence of Tajik nationalists in the opposition and their territorial claims on parts of Uzbekistan.[161] According to these explanations, because the Uzbekistani government had many ties with the old Khojenti elite, supporting it would not just check the influence of Islamists, democrats, and Tajik nationalists, but also would serve to maintain Karimov's influence in Tajikistan.[162] In late 1992, Russian and Uzbekistani support helped the Popular Front make significant military gains against the opposition.[163] In particular, the Uzbekistani security service organized and gave arms to ethnic Uzbek/Turkic forces from Hissor and Qurghonteppe while the Uzbekistani Ministry of Interior forces were directly involved in taking Dushanbe from the opposition in late 1992.[164]

Khudoberdiev and Boimatov: Once the Popular Front won the civil war, the Russian-supported Kulobis started to purge their former Khojenti allies from the government.[165] Karimov now had to search for a new source of influence inside Tajikistan. He settled on supporting Mahmud Khudoberdiev in Qurghonteppe and Ibadullo Boimatov in Hissor, both of whom are described as being part Uzbek.[166] After several years of declining influence and the rise of the

[159] Akhmedov, Said. (1998) 'Tajikistan II', in Waller, Coppieters and Malashenko (eds), *Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia.* London: Frank Cass, p. 183.

[160] Menon, Rajan and Hendrik Spruyt. (1998) 'Possibilities for Conflict resolution in Post-Soviet Central Asia', in Rubin and Snyder (eds) *Post-Soviet Political Order.* London: Routledge, p. 113; Shepherd, Monika. (1997a) 'Intervention in Central Asia', in *Perspective on Central Asia,* 7(3). At: www.bu.edu/iscip/vol7/Shepherd.html

[161] Rubin (1998), op cit, p. 156.

[162] Gretsky (1995), op cit, pp. 232-3.

[163] Akhmedov (1998), op cit, p. 172; Niyazi (1998), op cit, p. 162; Rubin (1998), op cit, p. 154.

[164] Rubin (1998), op cit, p. 153; Orr, M. cited in Horsman, Stuart. (1999) 'Uzbekistan's involvement in the Tajik civil war 1992-97: domestic considerations', in *Central Asian Survey,* 18(1), pp. 38-9.

[165] Gretsky (1995), op cit, pp. 232-3.

[166] Horowitz (2001), op cit, p. 652; Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, pp. 120-1. Fumagalli describes Khudoberdiev as half Lakay-Uzbek. See Fumagalli (2005), op cit, pp. 144, 160. Nourzhanov calls him an "ethnic Lakay Uzbek." See: Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, p. 115. Igor Rotar and Carlotta Gall identify him as "half-Uzbek." See Rotar (1998), op cit; Gall, C. (1996b) 'Tajikistan Stumbles Down Dark Road to Chaos', *The Moscow Times*, 2/13/96. Available at: www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/1996/02/13/017.html

Kulobis, Uzbekistan's government apparently hoped that by supporting Boimatov and Khudoberdiev it could compensate for the decline of its clients in Khojent, as well as balance the rise of Russia's influence and their Kulobi clients.[167]

Uzbekistan's support for Khudoberdiev was not an expression of ethnic solidarity, but instead due to more pragmatic reasons.[168] Although Uzbekistan's government criticized Tajikistan for not sufficiently protecting ethnic Uzbeks, Stuart Horsman believes this criticism was more likely just a tool to pressure Rahmonov, not concern for ethnic Uzbeks.[169] Karimov faced no pressure inside Uzbekistan to protect ethnic Uzbeks outside of Uzbekistan, which may be because there was no information about these ethnic Uzbeks available to the Uzbekistani public and therefore no significant public debate on the issue.[170] Karimov was concerned primarily with maintaining domestic security and "state-building" at home. Uzbek co-ethnics in neighboring countries were not a priority. Furthermore, Karimov did not have any motivation to annex any Uzbek areas in Tajikistan.[171] Karimov's support for ethnic Uzbeks outside of Uzbekistan was to protect his own interests, primarily domestic security, as well as maintaining tools for influence within those states.[172] Karimov did not want an anti-government coalition to succeed in neighboring Tajikistan since this may encourage anti-government mobilization in Uzbekistan,[173] as well as give refuge to anti-Karimov insurgents in a neighboring state.[174]

5.2. Afghanistan   5.2.1. Support from Uzbekistan: While Soviet troops were still in Afghanistan the governments in both Moscow and Tashkent were supporting Dostum in the north to create a buffer along the southern border of the USSR.[175] Later, the government of independent Uzbekistan apparently saw the Taliban's gains in Afghanistan as a threat to its own

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Payam Foroughi refers to Khudoberdiev as a Tajik-Uzbek mix. See Foroughi (2002), op cit, p. 50. Boimatov considers himself to be a Tajik. See Gall (1996a), op cit; Gall (1996b), op cit.

[167] Horsman (1999), op cit, p. 38; Gretsky (1995), op cit, pp. 232-3. By giving this support Karimov also seems to have sought to force the governments in Dushanbe and Moscow to act against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan forces inside Tajikistan. See: Int'l Crisis Group (2001), op cit, p. 27; Rubin, Barnett R. (2004) 'Central Asian Wars and Ethnic Conflicts - Rebuilding Failed States', UN Human Development Report, 2/19/04, p. 17.

[168] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, pp. 144, 160.

[169] International Crisis Group (2001), op cit, p. 28; Horsman (1999), op cit, p. 40.

[170] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 149.

[171] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, pp. 144, 160; Roy (2000), op cit, pp. 176-7.

[172] Rubin (2004), op cit, pp. 17-8, 23; Roy (2000), op cit, pp. 176-7.

[173] Akhmedov (1998), op cit, p. 183; Menon and Spruyt (1998), op cit, p. 113; Shepherd (1997a), op cit.

[174] Rubin (2004), op cit, p. 17; International Crisis Group (2001), op cit, 27.

[175] Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 56.

security and publicly stated its concern while voicing support for Dostum.[176] However, according to Anthony Hyman, the primary reason for the support was Uzbekistan's concern about the effect of "refugees, drugs, and ideology."[177] The Taliban was also of special concern to the Uzbekistani government because of the Taliban's direct support and sheltering of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, whose goal was the overthrow of the Uzbekistani government.[178]

At first Uzbekistan's President Karimov did not give Dostum any serious attention. During a visit to Tashkent in 1992 or 1993 Dostum was not granted a meeting with Karimov. Instead he met only with the Uzbekistani security and intelligence service that later became the strongest supporters of his Junbesh-i Milli.[179] At this time Uzbekistan provided aid not because of a threat from the still non-existent Taliban, but instead to maintain a level of influence in northern Afghanistan.[180] The Tajikistan civil war was also an early motivating factor behind Karimov's support for Dostum since the Tajik opposition forces used areas in Afghanistan controlled by the ethnic Tajik Massoud. Uzbekistan and Russia wanted Dostum to "neutralize" these Tajik opposition forces and to control the Afghan-Tajik border, stopping the cooperation between Massoud and the Tajik opposition.[181] Uzbekistani support continued as the Taliban made further gains, especially the capture of Kabul.[182] By late 1996 Karimov was publicly supporting Dostum.[183]

There is no evidence that Uzbekistan's support for Junbesh was motivated by a desire to annex the north of Afghanistan.[184] Indeed, the government of Uzbekistan even opposed Dostum's separatist threats. Under pressure from surrounding countries' governments, Dostum had retracted these threats and instead announced his goal for a "united, though decentralized,

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[176] Bhatty, Robin and David Hoffman. (2001) 'Afghanistan, Crisis of Impunity', *Human Rights Watch Report,* 13(3C). Online: www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701.pdf; Dorronsoro, Gilles (1995) 'Afghanistan's Civil War' *Current History*, Vol. 94, No. 588-96, p. 40; Magnus and Naby (1995), op cit, p. 616; Pratap, Anita. (1996) 'Taliban faces obstacles in unifying Afghanistan', CNN, 10/4/96. Online at: www.cnn.com/WORLD/9610/04/afghan/

[177] Maley (1998), op cit, p. 24.

[178] Van Der Schriek, Daan. (2005) 'The IMU: Fish in Search of a Sea', *Eurasia Insight*, (March 15, 2005). Available online at: www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp031405.shtml

[179] Fane, Daria. (1995) Response on online forum topic: 'Whither Uzbekistan?', Dialogue on CenAsia List, Available online at: www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/53/023.html

[180] Magnus and Naby (1995), op cit, p. 617.

[181] Rubin (1995a), op cit, pp. 130, 142.

[182] Barfield, Thomas. (1996) 'The Afghan Morass', *Current History*, Vol. 95, no. 597, p. 41; Anthony Hyman quoted in Maley (1998), op cit, p. 24.

[183] Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 138.

[184] Rubin (2004), op cit, p. 17.

Afghanistan."[185] The Uzbekistani government had no desire to set a precedent in the region by redrawing borders based on ethnicity as this could have harmful effects on Uzbekistan itself.[186] Gilles Dorronsoro describes Uzbekistan's support as being motivated by security concerns, "not as ethnic solidarity between Uzbeks, which seems to have been a marginal factor."[187] Barnett Rubin agrees, calling Uzbekistan's support "pragmatic rather than ideological or nationalist."[188]

Support from Uzbekistan was vital in helping Dostum administer the North. The assistance from Uzbekistan consisted of facilitating trade and direct financial aid, as well as needed items such as aviation fuel.[189] In addition to fuel, the Uzbekistani government also supplied weapons and ammunition.[190] Though Dostum has received aid from various countries at different times, Uzbekistan was the only country to support Dostum throughout the conflict.[191] However, even the aid from Uzbekistan was neither reliable nor of a steady level throughout the conflict in Afghanistan.[192] This aid to Junbesh ceased entirely when Dostum was defeated in 1998 at Mazar.[193] At this time Uzbekistan would not allow Dostum to continue operations from inside Uzbekistan, despite requests from Turkey and Russia, due to the fear of Taliban retaliation.[194] Nor was Dostum even granted asylum in Uzbekistan. He was merely allowed to transit through on his way to Turkey.[195]

5.2.2. Support from Russia, Iran and Turkey: Iran's leaders wanted to maintain northern Afghanistan as access corridor to Central Asia and pursued this aim by supporting the non-Pashtun minorities in the north.[196] However, Iranian policy towards Afghanistan was mostly defensive, while Pakistan chose a more active and interventionist involvement, especially with regard to their support of the Taliban.[197] Iran was likely motivated by the threat of a shared

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[185] Rubin, Barnett, R. (1995b) *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan.* Yale University Press, p. 275.

[186] Rais (1999), op cit, p. 8.

[187] Dorronsoro (2005), op cit, p. 262.

[188] Rubin (2004), op cit, p. 17.

[189] Magnus and Naby (1995), op cit, p. 616.

[190] Bhatty and Hoffman (2001), op cit, p. 47.

[191] Giustozzi, Antonio. (2000) *War, Politics, and Society in Afghanistan: 1978-1992.* Georgetown U Press, p. 245.

[192] Giustozzi (2003), op cit, p. 8; Rubin (2004), op cit, p. 23; Bhatty and Hoffman (2001), op cit, pp. 46-7.

[193] Bhatty and Hoffman (2001), op cit, p. 47.

[194] Rashid (2003b), op cit; Rashid, Ahmed. (2001b) 'Taliban in key defeat as rebels turn to ex-king', *The Daily Telegraph*, (September 25, 2001). Available online at:
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/09/25/wafg25.xml

[195] Giustozzi (2003), op cit, p. 8.

[196] Rais (1999), op cit, p. 7.

[197] Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 210.

border with the anti-Shia Taliban and, according to Anwar ul-Haq Ahady, Iran also feared having Afghanistan becoming a Saudi and Pakistani ally.[198] Pakistan stood to benefit economically from a secure and cooperative Afghanistan, which would ease trade with Central Asia. A secure border with Afghanistan would also permit the government to place more Pakistani troops on the Indian border.[199]

Iran played the role of intermediary, organizing meetings for Dostum with Malik (a rival for leadership of the Afghan Uzbek community) and Massoud.[200] Human Rights Watch (HRW) claims that Iran was the main supplier of military aid to the United Front from 1992-1995, aiding each faction separately including Dostum, though Massoud was favored in allocations of weapons.[201] Antonio Giustozzi also notes that Iran favored Massoud and the Hazara Shia party Wahdat.[202] While Dostum received material support from Iran immediately after the collapse of the Afghan communist government, he very soon moved away from any association with Iran.[203]

Russia was involved in supporting the anti-Taliban forces to maintain stability in Central Asia, and to keep its influence there strong.[204] Russia's assistance involved transporting arms and material provided by Iran through Tajikistan. However, unlike Iran, Russia was paid for the arms.[205] Towards the end of the conflict Russia directed most of its support to Massoud.[206]

Analysts have portrayed Turkish motivations for supporting Junbesh as ideological, i.e., an attempt to contain the Taliban and combat the type of Islam they promote.[207] The support for Junbesh has also been portrayed as part of Turkey's attempt to expand its influence into post-Soviet Central Asia, an explanation that covers various motives such as trade with the region and countering Russian influence there. The attempt to expand Turkish influence into Central Asia

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[198] Maley (1998), op cit, p. 25; Rashid, Ahmed. (2001a) 'Afghanistan: Year in Review', *Eurasia Insight*, (January 16, 2001). Available online at: www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav011601_pr.shtml

[199] Bhatty and Hoffman (2001), op cit, p. 24.

[200] Rashid (2001a), op cit.

[201] Bhatty and Hoffman (2001), op cit, pp. 12, 35-6.

[202] Giustozzi (2003), op cit, p. 8.

[203] Ahady, Anwar-ul-Haq. (1998) 'Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan', in William Maley (editor) *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban.* New York: New York University Press, p. 125.

[204] Stepanova, Ekaterina. (2001) 'US-Russia Cooperation in Afghanistan and Its Implications', *East European Constitutional Review*, 10(4). Available online at: www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol10num4/features/stepanova.html

[205] Bhatty and Hoffman (2001), op cit, p. 40.

[206] Giustozzi (2003), op cit, p. 8; Stepanova (2001), op cit; Risen, James. (1998) 'Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels', *New York Times*, 7/27/98. Online at: http://inic.utexas.edu/~bennett/__338/afghn.htm

[207] Council on Foreign Relations (2004) 'Turkey: Global Partner,' Available online at www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_show.htm?doc_id=191773&attrib_id=7590

was encouraged by both the US and by Turkey's pan-Turkic lobby groups who were then influential in forming Turkey's foreign policy.[208] Although in 1996 the Turkish government announced it would supply humanitarian aid to Dostum, the HRW report does not list Turkey as a supplier of military aid.[209] Nevertheless, Turkey aided Dostum beyond the time of any other country: after the Taliban defeated Dostum, all governments except Turkey ignored him.[210]

6. Mobilizing structures for Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Afghanistan

This section will analyze the mobilizing structures available to the Uzbek communities in both Tajikistan and Afghanistan. I will use a broad definition of a mobilizing structure as any network, association, unit, or part of a state structure from which mobilization can be generated.[211] Structures that pre-dated the civil wars as well as those that were created with a specific purpose will be analyzed. Additionally, ethnic identity and its role within the mobilizing structures will be discussed, with attention given to whether or not there was a clear Uzbek ethnic identity or general Uzbek group solidarity that pre-dated the conflicts.

6.1. Tajikistan   6.1.1. Identity and Mobilization: Uzbek Identity and Ethnic Cleavages:
According to John Schoeberlein, the Uzbeks outside of Uzbekistan did not go through the same process of assimilating many groups of Turkic and Uzbek peoples into a single Uzbek nationality as those inside Uzbekistan. So while the Uzbeks of Uzbekistan are not completely homogeneous, the Uzbeks outside of Uzbekistan are even less so. Schoeberlein warns that the total number or percentage of the population in Tajikistan registered as Uzbek should not be seen as a single united group.[212] Even if there were a single united group, one would have to consider Olivier

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[208] Winrow, G. (1997) 'Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus', *Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs*, 1(2). Online: http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue2/jv1n2a5.html; Rubin (1995a), op cit, p. 216. Some Turkish government officials even privately admitted that they supported Dostum because of their shared Turkic culture. See: Smith, Nancy Dewolf. (2002) 'Get Rid of the Warlords', *Opinion Journal*, Wall Street Journal Online. Available at: www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/nsmith/?id=95001788

[209] Bhatty and Hoffman (2001), op cit; Turkish Press Review. (1996) 'Turkey Vows to Help Pro-Dostum Forces', *Turkish Press Review*, (October 31 1996). Available online at: www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING/10/96x10x31.TXT

[210] Cotter, Michael W. (2001) 'Afghanistan and its Neighbours: A Primer for Today's World' *American Diplomacy,* 6(3) Available at: www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2001_10-12/cotter_mideast/cotter_mideast.html

[211] McCarthy (1996), op cit, p. 141.

[212] Schoeberlein-Engel, John. (1994) 'Conflicts in Tajikistan and Central Asia: the Myth of Ethnic Animosity', *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review*, 1(2), p.13.

Roy's warning against assuming that all members of an ethnic group defined by its spoken language actually share a coherent identity with a "will to express themselves politically."[213] Shirin Akiner also argues that "Uzbek," as well as "Tajik," should be considered an "umbrella term" for a group that does not share a common history of uniform identity.[214] In the same way that Soviet ethnographers included all Iranian- and Persian-speaking groups in the Tajik group, they also placed many Turkic groups in Tajikistan into the Uzbek group.[215] For example, Olimov and Olimova categorize the Uzbeks of Tajikistan as being in two distinct groups:

> [Uzbeks in Tajikistan] can be divided into two groups: The first group, living in the compact settlements of Uzbeks who have lost their tribal affiliation, are found mainly in the regions adjacent to Uzbekistan, on the low reaches of the rivers and also dispersed in the Leninabad region. The second group, consisting of only recently nomadic Uzbek and Turkic tribes - such as Lakai, Marka, Yuz, Karluk, Karshilik, Kungrat, Moghol, Barlos, Kipchak and others - live in settlements mainly in the Khatlon Region and in central Tajikistan, as well as a few locations in the Leninabad Region.[216]

Shirin Akiner gives a similar description of Uzbeks in Tajikistan. She states that the Uzbeks in the north comprise a uniform, homogeneous group. Akiner then identifies three origins for the Uzbek/Turkic people in the south. The first is located mostly in the southwest and is descended from the earliest Turkic migrations into the area. They have long been sedentarized and many speak Tajik as a first language. The second group is from the pre-thirteenth century wave of Turkic migration through the area. This group lives in the center-west and was semi-nomadic in recent history. The third group, which includes the Lakay, was part of the fifteenth century Turkic migration into the area. These groups have at times maintained a level of independence and have a strong communal identity.[217] According to Olivier Roy, the Lakay will identify Lakay as their primary identity. This group has preserved its communal identity and has its own mono-ethnic collective farms. However, other southern Uzbek groups, such as the Kungrat, Karluk, Durman and Barlos, will give their tribal identity only if pressured to do so. Their Uzbek

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[213] Roy, Olivier. (1995) *Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War*. Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, pp. 23-4.
[214] Akiner (2001), op cit, p. 9; Olimova (2004a), op cit, p. 144.
[215] Centlivres, Pierre and M. Centlivres-Demont. (1997) 'Tajikistan and Afghanistan', in *Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence*. MR Djalili, F. Grare and S. Akiner (eds). St. Martin's Press, p. 5; Rubin (2004), op cit, p. 10.
[216] Olimov and Olimova (2002), op cit, p. 249; see also B. Kh. Karmysheva quoted in Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont (1997), op cit, pp. 5-6. For a map of areas where ethnic Uzbeks predominate in Tajikistan see www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/tajikistan_ethnic_92.jpg
[217] Akiner (2001), op cit, p. 9; see also Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont (1997), op cit, pp. 4-7.

ethnic identity is more relevant than their tribal identity, which is no longer based on any real social structures.[218] Most importantly, despite all the diversity in the Uzbek/Turkic population, Tajiks have come to consider all Uzbek/Turkic peoples as one Uzbek group, despite their differences.[219]

Ethnic Uzbeks in the south, such as those in Hissor and Qurghonteppe, are much more isolated from the Tajiks than the Uzbeks in the north, and as a result the southern Uzbeks are less familiar with the Tajik language.[220] However, many of the Uzbek/Turkic groups in the south are currently going through what could be considered a process of assimilation. Uzbek-language schools are closing, exogamous marriages are common, and some of the Uzbek/Turkic groups - such as the Moghol, Yuz, Karluk, Qataghan, and others - are changing their ethnic identity in their passports to Tajik.[221] In a 2000 census the percentage of the population registered as Uzbek had decreased from 23.5% of the population in Tajikistan in 1989 to 15.3% in 2000, partially due to the introduction of ethnic categories previously included within Uzbek, as well the flight of Uzbeks to Uzbekistan early in the civil war.[222] According to Muriel Atkin, it is also possible that some Uzbeks are registering as Tajiks in the national census to "feel welcome," although this is disputed by Matteo Fumagalli.[223] His surveys showed that Uzbeks in Tajikistan, particularly in Khojent, show a strong attachment to their Uzbek ethnicity.[224] However, without a thorough qualitative or quantitative analysis available on the ethnic Uzbek population in the south, it is difficult to determine whether or not a process of "assimilation" is actually occurring.

Uzbek versus Tajik Identity in Tajikistan: It is not possible to divide Uzbeks and Tajiks into separate racial categories. The stereotypes for the ideal appearance (while not completely reliable in determining identity) of Turkic peoples (including Uzbeks) and Iranian peoples (including Tajiks) are very different. However, the population of sedentary Central Asia has been intermixed for so long that it is impossible to distinguish Tajiks from Uzbeks on physical

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[218] Roy (2000), op cit, esp. pp. 21, 23-4, also pp.15-17. Note: Roy offers no surveys or data to support this assertion.
[219] Akiner (2001), op cit, p. 9.
[220] Polat, Necati (2002) *Boundary Issues in Central Asia*. Ardsly, NY: Transnational Publishers, p. 91.
[221] Olimov and Olimova (2002), op cit, p. 249.
[222] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 121; 'Naselenie Respubliki Tadzhikistan 2000' quoted in Fumagalli (2005), op cit, pp. 89; T. R. Gurr quoted in Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 196.
[223] M. Atkin quoted in Foroughi, Payam. (2002) 'Tajikistan', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 22(1), p. 45; Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 121.
[224] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, pp. 98-107; see also Bozrikova, T. N. (2004) 'Problems of Ethnic Minorities in Tajikistan', UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Seminar *Minority Rights: Cultural Diversity and Development in Central Asia*, online at: www.ohchr.org/english/issues/minorities/docs/listdoc.doc, p. 14.

appearance alone.[225] Even dividing the two groups into linguistic categories is problematic; while bilingualism and mixed marriages are very common throughout Tajikistan, they are more common in Sughd.[226] Culturally, only language separates the Tajiks and Uzbeks, and the prevalence of bilingualism lessens the importance of this division.[227] When the Soviet republics were first formed Tajikistan was part of the Uzbek SSR, showing that perhaps even the Soviets did not considered the division to be an important political factor.

      Causes of the Civil War: Akiner states that the Tajik civil war was caused by several factors, including "generational, ideological, regional and inter-communal competition."[228] John Schoeberlein notes that there are two main interpretations for the cause of the war. The first points to the conflicting agendas for the future of society and politics in Tajikistan, agendas that included those of the former Communist conservatives, Islamists, nationalists, and democrats. The second blames the regional factions and their fight over controlling state resources.[229]

      Most of the conflict was among groups that were restructured and given political significance during the Soviet era rather than among ethnic groups or pre-existing regional identity groups. Before the Soviet era various identity groups, including Tajik subgroups, had an "ecological niche" in a society that was divided in a well-recognized manner. Collectivization made each of these groups, in their respective collective farms (that were often mono-ethnic in the south), competitors for land and resources.[230] At the republic level the Soviet government divided the state apparatus among the various factions, which produced competition for power and resources among the different region-based factions.[231] Pauline Jones Luong describes the Soviet structures and policies in Central Asia that encouraged the formation of regional identities:

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[225] Schoeberlein (1994), op cit, p. 8; Carlisle, Donald S. (1995) 'Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan and its Neighbours' in Yaacov Ro'i (editor) *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 75-6.
[226] Foroughi (2002), op cit, p. 45; Roy (1997), op cit, pp. 136, 144; Atkin, Muriel. (1992) 'Religious, National and Other Identities in Central Asia', pp 46-72 in Gross (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia*. Durham: Duke Press, p. 50; Naby, Eden. (1994) 'The Emerging Central Asia: Ethnic and Religious Factions' in Mesbahin (ed) *Central Asia and the Caucasus After the Soviet Union*. University Press of Florida, pp. 36, 38, 44; Schoeberlein (1994), op cit, p. 8; for a historical perspective see N. Mayev (1879) quoted in Olimov and Olimova (2002), op cit, p. 248.
[227] Roy (1997), op cit, p. 144; Foroughi (2002), op cit, 45.
[228] Akiner (2001), op cit, p. 40.
[229] Schoeberlein (2002), op cit, pp. 85-6.
[230] Roy (1997), op cit, pp. 133-5, 137-8; Roy, Olivier. (1999) 'Kolkhoz and Civil Society in the Independent States of Central Asia', in *Civil Society in Central Asia*. Seattle: UW Press, pp. 109-112; Roy (2000), op cit, pp. 85-100.
[231] Roy (1997), op cit, p. 146; Olimova, Saodat. (2004b) 'Opposition in Tajikistan: Pro et Contra', in *Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia*. London/ New York: Frank Cass Publishers, p. 250.

> [...] Soviet policies and institutions in Central Asia: (1) created and politicized regional identities by building interests and capacities based on regional affiliation and (2) promoted these regional identities while minimizing or even excluding sociopolitical cleavages based on tribe, religion, or nationality.[232]

Regional affiliations during the Soviet era became the source of economic and political power for the elites and the source of political and economic resources for the masses. At the republic level this patronage relationship united the elites and their regional constituencies in the competition for the resources controlled by the state. This system ensured that the people and the elites both had strong incentives to be loyal to their regions.[233]

After independence the leaders of most Central Asian states were able to maintain this system of regional patronage networks. However, due to the weakness of the system in Tajikistan, previously less privileged regions successfully challenged the dominant Leninabad faction for an increased share of power and resources.[234] The political competition immediately after independence in 1991 pitted the opposition, which included the Democratic Party, the Tajik nationalist party Rastokhez, and the heavily Gharmi Tajik Islamic Renaissance Party against the Khojenti faction in power. In response to the elections of November 1991, in which the Khojenti candidate Nabiev won, the opposition staged street protests against the government that ended in a power sharing agreement, and then soon after the removal of Nabiev from power in autumn of 1992. Immediately after the opposition's seizure of power, the Khojenti (Leninabadi) and Kulobi factions, along with their Uzbek allies in the south, mobilized to seize control of the state apparatus.[235] The Khojenti elite and their Kulobi allies both wished to preserve the system that kept the monopoly of power and the control of resources that they enjoyed during the Soviet era.[236] On the opposition side the Gharmi Tajiks and Pamiris within the military and police were quickly mobilized to support the opposition and moved into Dushanbe at the same time the Kulobis and Khojentis were doing the same.[237] The ensuing civil war was mainly between the

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[232] Jones Luong, Pauline. (2002) *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 63.
[233] Ibid, pp. 62-3.
[234] Ibid, p. 100; Jones-Luong. (1999) 'The Future of Central Asian Statehood', *Central Asia Monitor*, No. 1, p. 4, 8.
[235] Olivier Roy argues that these three parties were not just a coalition of excluded groups, but did at this time share a common Tajik nationalist ideology. See Roy (2002), 'Islamic Militancy: Religion and Conflict in Central Asia', in Mekenkamp, Tongeren, and Veen (eds), *Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia*. Rienner, pp. 97, 102; Horsman (1999), op cit, pp. 37-8; Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, pp. 111-2.
[236] Atkin (1997), op cit, pp. 614-6.
[237] Niyazi (1998), op cit, pp. 158-61.

Kulobis, southern Uzbeks and Hissoris, organized as the Popular Front, and the Gharmis and Ismaili Pamiris, organized as the United Tajik Opposition. The northern Khojent faction, both Uzbek and Tajik, avoided participating in the military conflict.[238]

Schoeberlein argues that whether or not the fight for control of resources was the cause of the civil war, the war quickly turned into a battle for resources that shaped the conflict from an early point and promoted the continuation of the conflict.[239] As the civil war progressed Tajikistan became further polarized and regional origin became more important.[240] Kirill Nourzhanov notes that it was regional affiliation, not Islam, democracy, or "constitutional order" that motivated people to join the conflict once the violence started.[241] Olivier Roy agrees, noting that despite the ideological beginnings of the conflict, the combatants' allegiances were determined by region of origin and by ethnicity.[242]

6.1.2. Uzbek political and military organization: Uzbek mobilization in the post-Soviet era
The Leninabad faction came to dominate the Tajik government after World War II, with a level of power sharing involving the Kulobi faction starting in the 1970s.[243] During this time the Tajik SSR's large Uzbek minority had an informally protected status thanks to the Tajik Communist Party's close links to Uzbekistan and the political domination of the Leninabadi faction that secured benefits for the north's population, including the Uzbeks.[244] After independence most Uzbeks throughout Tajikistan sided with the Popular Front.[245] This may have been partly due to fear of the nationalist opposition and partly as a strategy to maintain the benefits they enjoyed

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[238] Roy (1997), op cit, pp. 133-6; Roy (2002), op cit, p. 101; Nourzhanov (2005), pp. 112, 117.

[239] Schoeberlein (2002), op cit, pp. 85-6.

[240] Atkin (1997), op cit, p. 615.

[241] Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, p. 113. This view is supported by Akhmedov who notes that the high-level leaders of the individual factions and parties were predominantly from one region. See: Akhmedov (2005), op cit, pp. 184-5.

[242] Roy (1997), op cit, pp. 133-5, 137-8; Roy, Olivier. (1999), op cit, pp. 109-112; Roy (2000), op cit, pp. 85-100.

[243] Akbarzadeh (1996), op cit, p. 1108; Rubin (2004), op cit, p. 10; Foroughi (2002), op cit, p. 46; Akiner, Shirin. (2001), quoted in Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 153.

[244] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 217; Horowitz (2001), op cit, p. 650. The close relationship between the Leninabadis and Uzbekistan was partly owing to Tajikistan's status as being formerly part of Uzbekistan during the early Soviet when Tajikistan was an autonomous Republic within the Uzbek SSR. Also, between 1924 and 1929 Khojent City was part of the Uzbek SSR.

[245] Roy (1997), op cit, pp. 135-6.

during the Soviet era as part of the Khojent faction.[246] Uzbek support in the south for the Popular Front was for protection from attacks by Gharmi Tajiks.[247]

After the main conflict had ceased, elections were held in which the Leninabadi candidate Abdullajanov lost to the Kulobi leader Rahmonov,[248] despite Abdullajanov having had near universal support in the north, including from the Uzbeks there who support leaders who represent the interests of the north as a whole rather than any narrow ethnic interests. However, since 1994 most Uzbeks have supported Rahmonov out of a concern for stability. Yet according to Fumagalli the Uzbek support is eroding.[249]

After the Kulobis had secured power they moved to marginalize their former allies, the Khojentis and the southern Uzbeks.[250] And with the final peace agreement in June 1997 President Rahmonov was free to focus his efforts on further marginalizing his former allies, the Khojent faction and the southern Uzbeks.[251] The Kulobis have since concentrated on taking control of the economic assets in the north.[252] Meanwhile in Sughd there is no leader who can unite all the various interests in the north, making it unlikely that the Khojent faction can re-establish its previous level of political power.[253]

Currently in the north there is no visible ethnic Uzbek political mobilization.[254] The Uzbeks here have little communal cohesion, there exists a leadership deficit in Uzbek community, and Uzbek leaders have become "risk-adverse."[255] Demands for autonomy for Sughd or secession are rare among Uzbeks in Sughd, being dismissed by them as unrealistic.[256] The only explicitly Uzbek organization is the Society of Uzbeks, which was founded in 1990.[257] However, the Society suffers from a lack of funding, low membership, and poor coordination among the five regional branches, of which the northern branch is mostly engaged in education issues. Furthermore, the Society has a close relationship with the state, and thus is more beholden

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[246] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 217.
[247] Shepherd, Monika. (1997b) 'Turf war erupts in Dushanbe, spreads west and south', *The NIS Observed*, 2(15), 8/20/97. Online at: www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol2/ed15.html#monika; Nourzhanov, Kirill. (2005), op cit, p. 116.
[248] Akbarzadeh (1996), op cit, p. 1158.
[249] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, pp. 89, 102, 138, 142, 217.
[250] Horsman (1999), op cit, p. 38.
[251] Horowitz (2001), op cit, p. 652.
[252] Schoeberlein (2002), op cit, p. 89.
[253] Nourzhanov, K. (1998) 'Seeking Peace in Tajikistan', *Central Asia Monitor*, No. 6, p. 21.
[254] Ibid, pp. 185-6; Minorities at Risk (2003a), op cit.
[255] Minorities at Risk (2003a), op cit; Fumagalli (2005), op cit, pp. 217, 242, 247-8.
[256] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, pp. 181-2.
[257] Olimov and Olimova (2002), op cit, p. 255.

to state concerns than those of its Uzbek constituents. Therefore it cannot become a vehicle for Uzbek demands and grievances.[258]

The Southern Uzbeks: Qurghonteppe: Upon Tajikistan's independence the Association of Lakays of Tajikistan claimed to speak for the Lakay population of Tajikistan, which totals about 100,000 people. The Lakay Association demanded that Lakays be recognized as a distinct group from the Uzbeks and be granted autonomy within Tajikistan.[259] However, the Lakay's primary concerns were the land disputes that brought them into conflict with the Gharmi Tajiks. Soon after independence the pastoral Lakay who had been deported from the Qurghonteppe region began to return and attempted to reclaim their historical land from the Tajiks who settled there. As a result, during the civil war the conflict in Qurghonteppe included an interethnic element as Lakay and Gharmi Tajiks fought each other here,[260] partly over the land issue but also because the Lakay faction supported the Khojent-Kulob Popular Front in the civil war, probably in the hope that they would be rewarded with autonomy and a share of the power. However, when the power sharing agreement between the Popular Front and the UTO was reached the Lakay were left out. This exclusion, along with the issue of Tajik refugee return into Uzbek and Lakay areas, resulted in a dispute where a key Lakay field commander, the half Uzbek Fayzullah Saidov, was killed by a Kulobi faction leader. This created a division between the Kulobis and the Lakay that led to conflict between the two factions later.[261]

Mahmud Khudoberdiev, the Deputy Military Commissioner of Qurghonteppe *Oblast*, became a prominent commander when the Tajik conflict reached Qurghonteppe in 1992. Khudoberdiev formed a strong militia and gained a reputation as a protector of the local Uzbek population by fighting the UTO forces.[262] By 1995 Khudoberdiev was strong enough to negotiate

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[258] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, pp. 195-8, 200-1.

[259] Gretsky (1995), op cit, p. 228. I could find no other sources on the continued activities of the Association.

[260] Olimov and Olimova (2002), op cit, p. 257. In 1992 the Kulobis succeeded in merging Qurghonteppe, which was mostly ethnic Uzbek, with Kulob, creating the province of Khatlon in an attempt to lessen the Uzbek domination of Qurghonteppe. See Polat (2002), op cit, pp. 91-2; Schoeberlein (2002), op cit, p. 89.

[261] Gretsky (1995), op cit, p. 228; Roy (2000), op cit, p. 49; Polat (2002), op cit, pp. 91-2; Schoeberlein (2002), op cit, p. 89.

[262] Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, pp. 115, 119; Nourzhanov (1998), op cit, pp. 21-2. Or, as another version has it, Khudoberdiev moved against the opposition forces after his house was burned and his relatives killed in punishment for his refusal to join the opposition. See *ASIA-Plus*, (No date) 'Mahmud Khudoberdiev: I am the agent of my people', Asia-Plus. Online at: www2.internews.ru/ASIA-PLUS/bulletin_21/who.html; Smith, R. Grant. (1999) 'Tajikistan: the rocky road to peace', *Central Asian Survey*, 18(2), p. 249-50; Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, p. 121.

an agreement for autonomy with the government of Tajikistan.[263] Between 1995 and 1998 Khudoberdiev moved militarily against the central government several times. In his last action he invaded Sughd from Uzbekistan before being defeated by a combined government and UTO force. Khudoberdiev remained in exile until his death in 2001.[264]

Hissor: The former government Speaker Safarali Kenjaev recruited heavily from the Uzbeks in Hissor early in the conflict.[265] The next leader to become prominent in Hissor was Ibadullo Boimatov, a Popular Front militia commander described by Kirill Nourzhanov as having been "the leader of the Uzbeks in the Hissor region."[266] Boimatov was pushed out of power in Tursunzade by government forces in 1995 and returned briefly in 1996 but failed to remain in power.[267] In early 1996, after joining Khudoberdiev in an uprising, he was appointed as the trade representative for Tajikistan in Tashkent.[268]

6.2. Afghanistan   6.2.1. Identity and mobilization: Uzbek Identity and Ethnic Cleavages:

No strong collective identity has emerged in Afghanistan to bridge differences of language, religion, and other cultural traits in the population.[269] According to Louis Dupree:

> Often, when two Afghans meet and complete the first formalized salutations, they compare kinship affiliations. They begin with major ethnic group, and go down the line until they find a common term to relate or not relate to one another. Their subsequent interactions are defined by this exercise in identification.[270]

"Afghan" and "Afghanistan" were constructions introduced by the British for the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1801.[271] The label "Afghan" is rejected by Uzbeks, as well as other minorities, who

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[263] Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, p. 118, 121.

[264] Akiner (2001), op cit, pp 73, 89-90; Gall (1996b), op cit; Rotar (1998), op cit; Rotar (1999), op cit; Foroughi (2002), op cit, p. 51; Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, pp. 123-4.

[265] Jawad, Nassim and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. (1995) *Tajikistan: A Forgotten Civil War*. London: Minority Rights Group, p. 16; Atkin (1997), op cit, p. 609.

[266] Akiner (2001), op cit, pp. 89, 40 footnote 11; Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, pp. 119-21. Olivier Roy and Shirin Akiner describe Boimatov as an Uzbek. See Roy (2000), op cit, p. 142; Akiner (2001), op cit, p. 89. However, Boimatov has said he considers himself to be Tajik, despite being half Uzbek by birth. See: Gall, Carlotta. (1996a) 'Tajik Warlord-Trader Lowers Guns, For Now', *The Moscow Times*, February 8, 1996. Available online at: www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/1996/02/08/004.html

[267] Akiner (2001), op cit, p. 89.

[268] Gall, Carlotta. (1996a), op cit.

[269] Goodson (1998), op cit, pp. 270, 274; Schetter (2005), op cit, pp. 56-7; Parvanta, A. (2002) 'Afghanistan - Land of the Afghans?', in Noelle-Karimi, Schetter and Schlagintweit (eds) *Afghanistan - A Country without a State?* Frankfurt aM, Germany: IKO, p. 19.

[270] Dupree (1973), op cit, p. 183.

[271] Misra (2004), op cit, p. 43.

equate that term with "Pashtun".[272] As Nancy Hatch-Dupree states, "To an Uzbek, for instance, an Afghan is a Pashtun, pure and simple."[273]

Unlike the Pashtuns, Uzbeks are descendents of Turko-Mongolian tribes. This, in most cases, allows them to be distinguished by facial features from the Pashtuns.[274] However, the Uzbeks are culturally indistinguishable from the Tajiks in Afghanistan, except for language, which is not too divisive since most Uzbek men are able to speak Dari, the language of the Tajiks in Afghanistan and the interethnic language in the north.[275]

Interethnic marriages and marriages across sectarian lines are not common in Afghanistan.[276] In particular, Uzbek men rarely marry Pashtun women.[277] Nancy Tapper notes that Uzbeks prefer endogamy but do not prohibit exogamy as absolutely as do the Pashtuns, particularly the Durrani Pashtuns.[278]

The emergence of ethnic consciousness in Afghanistan has been a gradual process. Larry Goodson claims that ethnic consciousness first noticeably increased during the period of anarchy in the nineteenth century. Although this was not modern nationalism, "it laid the foundation for ethnic relations in Afghanistan today."[279] Shahrani argues, in a manner similar to Brubaker's account of the institutionalization of nationality in the Soviet Union and its successor states, that

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[272] Hyman (2002), op cit, p. 302; Shalinsky (1982), op cit, p. 80; Kakar, H. (1974) 'Trends in Modern Afghan History' in *Afghanistan in the 1970s*. Dupree and Albert (eds.) NY: Praeger, p. 13; Rubin (1995b), op cit, p. 23. For a dissenting opinion see: Pohly, Michael (2002) 'Perceptions of State and Organisation of the Northern Alliance', in Noelle-Karimi, Schetter and Schlagintweit (eds) *Afghanistan - A Country without a State?* Frankfurt a.M.: IKO, p. 179. Note: Pohly is the only source I found who claimed that "Afghan" and "Pashtun" are no longer synonymous.
[273] Dupree, Nancy Hatch. (1974) 'Archaeology and the Arts in the Creation of a National Consciousness', in Louis Dupree and Linette Alberts (editors), *Afghanistan in the 1970s*. New York: Praeger Publishers, p. 203.
[274] Goodson (2001), op cit, pp. 14-6.
[275] Aslanov, M.G., E.G. Gafferberg, N. A. Kisliakov, K.L Zadykhina, and G.P. Vasilyeva. (1969) 'Ethnography of Afghanistan', in *Afghanistan: Some New Approaches*. Grassmuck (ed). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, p. 73; Naby, Eden. (1984) 'The Uzbeks in Afghanistan', in *Central Asian Survey*, 3(1), pp. 4-5; Magnus and Naby (1998), op cit, p. 17.
[276] Goodson (1998), op cit, p. 274. Sven Simonsen states that after two decades of war the number of interethnic marriages has decreased in the rural areas, see Simonsen (2004), op cit, p. 709.
[277] Dupree, L. (1973), op cit, p. 188; Smith, H. Harvey, Donald Bernier, Frederica M. Bunge, Frances C. Rintz, Rinn-Supp Shinn, and Suzanne Teleki. (1973) *Area Handbook for Afghanistan*. Washington: US Government Printing Office, p. 103; Tapper, N. (1991), op cit, pp. 38-9. The two most powerful Uzbek leaders provide the exception to this rule: Rashid Dostum is married to a Pashtun of the Popalzai tribe, see Williams, Brian Glyn. (2005) 'Target Dostum: The Campaign Against Northern Alliance Warlords', *Terrorism Monitor* 3(20), 10/21/05. Online: http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/ter_003_020.pdf Malik Pahlavan, the Uzbek leader from Faryab, is identified as half-Pashtun, see Marlowe, Ann. (2002) '"Warlords" and "Leaders"', *National Review Online*, 2/18/02. Available online at: www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-marloweprint021802.html
[278] Tapper, N. (1991), op cit, pp. 64-5.
[279] Goodson (2001), op cit, p. 30.

the policy of the Afghan state throughout history has been to use "ethnic and tribal affiliations as a basis for distribution of scarce resources – economic, educational, and political," thereby giving ethnicity a political significance.[280] The importance of ethnicity is continuing today and, according to Goodson, "ethnicity is the most important contextual factor shaping Afghanistan today, [...]."[281] Scott Radnitz writes:

> The current ethnic divisions have not always been politically salient. Because the basis of political authority in Afghanistan has traditionally been on the sub-ethnic level, ethnic identity is not always relevant – when fighting outside invaders, Afghans have no trouble uniting across ethnic lines. Only when the country erupts into civil war has ethnic identity become politically salient.[282]

Radnitz claims that although ethnic consciousness in Afghanistan is "[…] strong, reinforced by linguistic differences and nineteenth century British policies that usually supported Pashtuns over other groups, politics in Afghanistan has always been decidedly local [with mobilization taking place at the level of local kin networks]."[283] We will recall Olivier Roy's argument, cited above, against assuming that all members of an ethnic group defined by its spoken language actually share a coherent identity with a "will to express themselves politically." Many others agree that loyalties are strongest within local communities, not at a national or ethnic level.[284]

Qawm: Olivier Roy concedes that ethnic identities are important but argues that "primordial" local identities take precedence.[285] These local identities are usually called *qawm*:

> A qawm is the term used to describe any segment of society bound by solidarity ties, whether it be an extended family, clan, occupational group or village. Qawm is based on kinship and patron-client relationships; before being an ethnic of tribal group, it is a solidarity group, which protects its members from the encroachments of the state and other *qawm*, but it is also the scene of internal competition between contenders for local supremacy.[286]

Nazif Shahrani describes the importance of *qawm* in the mobilization process:

[280] Brubaker, Rogers. (1994) 'Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalized Account', *Theory and Society*, 23(1), pp. 47-78; Shahrani (2004), op cit, p. 230.
[281] Goodson (2001), op cit, p. 14.
[282] Radnitz (2004), op cit, p. 523.
[283] Radnitz (2004), op cit, p. 524.
[284] Goodson (2005), op cit, pp. 12-3.
[285] Roy (2002), op cit, p. 4.
[286] Pierre Centlivres, Olivier Roy, and Whitney Azoy quoted in Roy (1989), op cit, p. 71.

Ethnicity and kinship, which are expressed linguistically through the same terms, *qawm* (people, tribe, group), *wulus* (nation, tribe, relatives), and *tyfah* (clan, tribe, group), represent the same or similar ideological frameworks in Afghanistan. Together with Islam, they provide the most fundamental bases for individuals and collective identities and loyalties, and they are the most persistent and pervasive potential bases for the organization of social formations, for the mobilization of social action, and for the regulation of social interaction among individuals and between social groups [...]."[287]

Shahrani notes that local loyalties and responsibilities between leader and follower are not static but rather change according to such circumstances as "shifting boundaries" and factional struggles.[288] Richard Tapper also cites the flexibility of the *qawm*:

According to context and situation, qawm may involve a varying number of individuals, close kinsmen, a village, an ethnic group, a religious sect or a linguistic group. It is therefore a highly ambiguous and flexible concept allowing for strategic manipulations of identity.[289]

Changes in economic conditions can also cause realignments in *qawm* structure. The change in Afghanistan towards a modern market economy has lessened the importance of genealogical relations and increased the significance of patron-client economic relations, encouraging new *qawms* to appear based on patronage networks.[290] Roy, Shahrani and Tapper all give definitions for *qawm* that demonstrate not only the importance of the *qawm*, but also its flexible nature. This clearly has significance when considering the possibility of strategic manipulation of identity, as well as the shifting of individual and group loyalties from one identity to another.

During the Soviet-Afghan conflict *qawm* affiliations became more relevant than in the preceding decades. For example, it became common for a *qawm* leader to make a deal with a government militia and bring all his followers.[291] This happened more among Uzbeks since the "centralized" and "undemocratic" nature of the Uzbek *qawms* ensured that members would willingly join and not dissent from their leader's decision.[292] Similar recruitment tactics among Tajiks and Pashtuns failed since they would not follow their leaders into the government forces

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[287] Shahrani (2002), op cit, p. 717. Italics added.
[288] Shahrani (1998), op cit, pp. 219-20. See also Dorronsoro (2005), op cit, p. 111.
[289] Tapper, Richard. (1988) 'Ethnicity, Order, and Meaning in the Anthropology of Iran and Afghanistan', in J.-P. Digard (Ed) *Le Fait Ethnique en Iran et en Afghanistan*. Paris: Editions du CNRS, p. 27.
[290] Rasuly-Paleczek, Gabriele. (2001), op cit, p. 152; Roy (1995), op cit, p. 108.
[291] Sinno, Abdulkader. (2002) *Organizing to Win in Afghanistan and Beyond*. Ph.D. Dissertation, UCLA, p. 169.
[292] Ibid, p. 187; Giustozzi (2002), op cit, p. 128.

as readily as Uzbeks.[293] Although at the beginning of the war local commanders used their local *qawm* to mobilize, at a later point their power bases expanded geographically and gave political significance to larger identities.[294] This process of consolidation encouraged many *qawms* to identify themselves as part of a larger macro-ethnic identity in order to associate with a stronger group and thus acquire political representation in national politics.[295]

Afghans usually will identify themselves by their *qawm*. Roy states that when they identify themselves by the language they speak they do so "without any ethnic connotation."[296] Gilles Dorronsoro argues that macro-ethnic identity (Uzbek, Pashtun, etc.) is too encompassing to be used as a mobilizing framework, meaning that appeals by ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize to protect one's own ethnic group are likely to be ineffective.[297] Robert Canfield claims that people are aware of their broader macro-ethnic identity but it is the kin networks and patron-client networks that are more important to the people and that form cleavages within and across the ethnic group identities.[298] Yet despite the limitations to ethno-political mobilization in Afghanistan, an Uzbek-dominated faction emerged as a result of the mobilization process as *qawms* and individuals attached themselves to larger, more powerful units.[299]

With Uzbek tribal identities having disappeared or lost their significance, the Uzbek *qawm*, along with those of the Hazaras and Tajiks, have traditionally been of a smaller scale than the Pashtun tribal confederations. Because of this the Uzbeks had not able to mobilize on a scale as large, or with as much cohesion, as the Pashtuns. However, by 1995 the concept of *qawm* was expanding to include all the Uzbeks of Afghanistan. This was a process that began in the 1970s when national politics began to have an effect at the local level. At this time the Hazaras and

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[293] Sinno (2002), op cit, p. 190.

[294] Dorronsoro (2005), op cit, pp. 20, 211. Dorronsoro gives the example of the Tajik Panjshiris.

[295] Roy, Olivier. (1990) *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. Cambridge University Press, p. 224.

[296] Roy (1995), op cit, p. 24; Roy (2002), op cit, p. 4.

[297] Dorronsoro (2005), op cit, pp. 108-9, 258.

[298] Canfield, R. (1986) 'Ethnic, Regional, and Sectarian Alignments in Afghanistan' in *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*. Banuazizi and Weiner (Eds.) Syracuse: Syracuse U. Press, p. 76.

[299] Roy and Dorronsoro concede this point 15 years apart. See: Roy, Olivier. (1990) *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. Cambridge University Press, p. 224; Dorronsoro (2005), op cit, pp. 20, 211. The emergence of a broad Uzbek identity is discussed by Gabriel Rasuly-Paleczek. See: Rasuly-Paleczek, Gabriele. (2001) 'The Struggle for the Afghan State: Centralization, Nationalism and their Discontents', in Van Schendel and Zurcher (eds) *Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World*. London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 151-2, 161, 174, 176.

Turkic peoples (Uzbeks and Turkmen) were becoming more aware of how they were dominated and excluded economically and politically by the Pashtuns.[300]

6.2.2. The politicization of Uzbek identity since 1978: Olivier Roy suggests that many Uzbeks were at first optimistic about the 1978 Marxist coup. Roy posits that the Uzbeks, unlike other nationalities, had gone through a transformation of traditional social structures and so were more open to the changes promised by the new communist leaders.[301]

However, power was still held by Pashtuns. For example, the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan originally had two factions: Khalq and Parcham. Parcham included many minorities, including Uzbeks, while Khalq was essentially a Pashtun faction.[302] During the power struggle between the two groups Khalq used the concept of ethnic supremacy to eliminate political rivals and this belief in ethnic supremacy dominated the political environment once Khalq triumphed.[303] Khalq's nationalities policy gave an elevated role to the Pashtuns.[304] Its promotion of minority languages, such as the unprecedented opportunities for the Uzbek language in publishing, education and in the media,[305] was possibly a strategy to weaken Dari, and to strengthen Pashto in the long-term.[306] The Babrak Karmal government apparently considered Pashtuns to be the core of the resistance and introduced policies to isolate them. These policies included creating the Nationalities Ministry that sought support from Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen by elevating their languages to official status and allowing their languages in the classrooms. The government leaders seemed to hope that the use of Dari as a second language by Uzbeks and Turkmen would decline and isolate them from Pashtuns for whom Dari

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[300] Rasuly-Paleczek (2001), op cit, pp. 151-2, 161, 174, 176. Afghanistan's Uzbeks no longer have tribal identities or institutions. See: Roy (1989), op cit, p. 73; Aslanov (1969), op cit, p. 73; Magnus and Naby (1998), op cit, p. 17; Tapper, R. (1984), op cit, p. 233. The tribal identities that preceded the broader Uzbek identity in Afghanistan include Qataghan, Sarai, Ming, Kungrat, Barlos, Qarluq, etc. See: Aslanov (1969), op cit, p. 72. The locations for these tribes are: Qataghan in Kunduz and Tashkurgan, Sarai in Mazar-i Sharif and Balkh, Ming in Balkh, Mazar-i Sharif, Maimana and Tashkurgan, Kungrat in Kunduz and Mazar-i Sharif, Durman in Hazrat-i Imam Sahib, and with Moghol, Turk, Barlos and Qarluq settlements in Qataghan and Badakhshan. See: Makhamov quoted in Khashimbekov (1994), op cit, p. 15.

[301] Roy (1990), op cit, p. 103.

[302] Misra (2004), op cit, p. 45.

[303] Nojumi, Neamatollah (2002) *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*. New York: Palgrave, p. 65.

[304] Magnus and Naby (1995), op cit, p. 612.

[305] Naby (1984), op cit, p. 17; Newell, Richard S. (1986) 'The Prospects for State Building in Afghanistan', in *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (Eds.) Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, p. 118.

[306] Ahady, Anwar-ul-Haq. (1995) 'The Decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan', *Asian Survey*, 35(7), p. 622.

is the language of interethnic communication and bring them politically closer to their co-ethnics in the Soviet Union.[307]

Eden Naby believes that the nationalities policies did have some effect in politicizing ethnicity, particularly among Uzbeks, a group with few members literate in their own language as late as 1980.[308] Initially after the 1978 coup, these policies appear to have worked and Uzbeks were not active in the resistance. However, it is possible that Kabul was too far away and its policies too irrelevant to local affairs for Uzbeks to be concerned.[309] Antonio Giustozzi agrees, stating that the influence of the minority nationalities policies was limited mainly to the middle class and intellectuals.[310]

As part of their "divide and rule" strategy the Soviet-backed government gave favorable treatment to the Tajiks and Uzbeks. The Tajiks and Uzbeks in the bureaucracy and in commerce were allowed to continue their activities as they had before, while Pashtuns were expected to participate in the communist reforms and were punished if they resisted. According to Amalendu Misra, this strategy likely contributed to increased interethnic tension.[311] Another effect of the Soviet-Afghan war was the alienation of the Pashtuns due to the Soviet use of Uzbek and Tajik soldiers from the Soviet republics.[312] Furthermore, the abusive behavior of Afghan Uzbek militiamen in Pashtun areas also likely created anger among Pashtuns. [313] As for the Pashtuns in the north there was significant vulnerability. During the Soviet-Afghan war Pashtuns left the north for the south or for refugee camps in higher numbers than the other ethnic groups and the Pashtun refugees returned to the north in smaller numbers. These varying levels of migration between ethnic groups resulted in an ethnic redistribution of the population in the north.[314]

Overall, the Soviet invasion strengthened tribal and ethnic loyalties. This manifested itself in the civil war to follow in which Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras often fought each

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[307] Banuazizi, Ali and Myron Weiner. (1986) 'Introduction', in *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*. Syracuse University Press, p. 15; Parvanta (2002), op cit, p. 22.

[308] Naby (1984), op cit, p. 17; Naby, Eden. (1980) 'The Ethnic Factor in Soviet-Afghan Relations', *Asian Survey,* Vol. 20. No. 3, p. 248.

[309] Naby, Eden.(1988) 'Ethnic Factors in Afghanistan's Future', in Bo Huldt and Erland Jansson (eds). *The Tragedy of Afghanistan: The Social, Cultural, and Political Impact of the Soviet Invasion*. London: Croon Helm, pp. 66-7.

[310] Giustozzi (2000), op cit, pp. 242-3.

[311] Misra (2004), op cit, p. 48.

[312] Giustozzi (2000), op cit, p. 118.

[313] Sinno (2002), op cit, p. 252.

[314] Khashimbekov (1994), op cit, pp. 13-4. Example: In Faryab Province the Uzbek portion of the population increased from 40% in 1979 to 56% in 1986.

other.[315] However, according to Bernt Glatzer, the leaders of most factions were not motivated by ethnicity in the initial mobilization process. Out of necessity the commanders recruited in their local home areas, which were usually dominated by one ethnic group. This resulted in factions with an ethnic character.[316] As the competing factions became increasingly mono-ethnic, ideology became less important. Even before the mujahideen took Kabul in April 1992 the various factions were using ethnicity to determine how they would align themselves.[317]

Civil War and the Rise of the Taliban: As early as 1992-93 the factions fighting in Kabul were organized into various factions that were each dominated by a single ethnic group. This included the Hizb-i Wahdat for the Hazaras, the various Pashtun factions, as well as Junbesh-i Milli and Jamiat-i Islami, whose leadership was dominated by Uzbeks and Tajiks, respectively.[318] Each of the leaders attempted to mobilize broader support and gain legitimacy by claiming to be the leader of a macro-ethnic group.[319] Olivier Roy explains the increased importance of ethnic identity as

> [...] a consequence of the war, of strategic alignments with foreign countries and of the need for small local solidarity groups to identify themselves with larger units. It is also a symptom of the internal struggle between the Islamists themselves: it is now totally unlikely that the Islamist political model can bypass the ethnic divide, which has grown apace largely because of the absolute failure of the political model.[320]

However, while using ethnicity for recruiting purposes, leaders often made public pronouncements arguing that they represent the interests of all ethnic groups.[321]

The rise of the Pashtun Taliban in the south was the next factor that increased ethnic factionalization. The Pashtun make-up of the Taliban gave the group its strength in the south among the Pashtuns but was a liability elsewhere where it antagonized the other groups.[322] Support for the Taliban was almost entirely Pashtun and its leadership was exclusively Pashtun.

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[315] Misra (2004), op cit, pp. 51-2.
[316] Glatzer (1998), op cit, pp. 179-80.
[317] Roy, Olivier. (1998) 'Has Islamism a future in Afghanistan?', in William Maley (editor) *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban.* New York: NYU Press, p. 200; Rubin (1995a), op cit, p. 121.
[318] Goodson (2001), op cit, p. 75; Saikal (1998a), op cit, p. 31.
[319] Schetter (2001), op cit. Bernt Glatzer cites the example of the Pashtun Gulbuddin Hekmatyar switching from using Islam to Pashtun-solidarity as a recruiting tool. See: Glatzer (1998), op cit, p. 178.
[320] Roy (1998), op cit, pp. 205-6.
[321] Ibid, p. 200.
[322] Ibid, p. 208; Maley, William. (2002) *The Afghan Wars*. NY: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 223.

One explanation for the high level of support for the Taliban among Pashtuns was that it was a backlash against the other nationalities that had made gains against the Pashtuns.[323]

The Taliban strongly opposed any regional autonomy for the non-Pashtun nationalities.[324] This opposition to regional autonomy went beyond the Pashtun historical dominance, which had provided non-Pashtun elites limited power.[325] As part of this policy, the Taliban purged the bureaucracy in Kabul of all senior Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, replacing them with Pashtuns. They also replaced Dari with Pashto as the administrative language of the government.[326]

The minorities opposed the Pashtun Taliban.[327] The northern nationalities viewed the Taliban's idea of a state to be "extremely violent, intolerant and primitive."[328] This view of Pashtuns and the Taliban was encouraged by the leaders of minorities to mobilize support within their communities. Because of this tactic the Pashtuns, including those in the north, became alienated from the minority-dominated factions.[329]

On one level the Afghan civil war was a struggle between Pashtuns seeking to reassert their dominance and the minorities who wanted to assert their autonomy and secure a share of power at the center.[330] Most analysts consider that this led to the sharpening of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and *qawm* divisions in Afghanistan.[331] Conrad Schetter qualifies this explanation, saying that while war and mobilization have led to "ethnicization" of the factions and their leaders, the people have not been "ethnicized" to the same extent. Indeed, Schetter claims that ethnic identity is still not of "much significance" to the people and that the local identities continue to supersede the larger ethnic identities.[332] This is despite efforts of "ethnic entrepreneurs" to create an idea of "ethnoscapes," or a larger territory that exclusively belongs to

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[323] Hyman (2002), op cit, p. 312; Roy (1998), op cit, p. 208; Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 35. However, support for the Taliban sometimes came in the form of cautious toleration by Pashtun nationalists rather than direct support. See Rais (1999), op cit, p. 3. Eventually most Pashtun commanders, including the northern Pashtun leaders, joined the Taliban. See Shahrani (1998), op cit, p. 226 footnote 25; Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 62; Roy (1998), op cit, p. 208.
[324] Rais (1999), op cit, p. 5.
[325] Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 212.
[326] Parvanta (2002), op cit, p. 23; Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 101.
[327] Goodson (2001), op cit, p. 124; Saikal (1998b), op cit, p. 119.
[328] Rais (1999), op cit, p. 6.
[329] Glatzer (1998), op cit, p. 180.
[330] Rais (1999), op cit, p. 2.
[331] Goodson (2001), op cit, pp. 82, 132; Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 54.
[332] Schetter (2001), op cit; Schetter (2003), op cit.

one ethnic group.[333] Schetter concedes that as groups were forced to flee violence they developed a broader conception of identity, as their local kin networks were no longer as important. However, he maintains that this broader identity is not necessarily an "ethnic" identity. For purposes here it is important to note that Schetter acknowledges the "ethnic factor" is more relevant in Afghanistan's north,[334] where the vast majority of Uzbeks live.

Among those dissenting from Schetter's argument is Sven Simonsen. Simonsen argues that it is unrealistic to claim that, while politics has become ethnicized, the people of Afghanistan have not become ethnicized.[335] Olivier Roy argues, in contrast to Schetter, that individuals in Afghanistan increasingly identify themselves with the large ethnic identities for several reasons. Roy identifies internal migrations due to the conflict, the need to form into larger groups to influence politics beyond a local setting, and the use by journalists and anthropologists of ethnonyms to describe broad identities in Afghanistan. Roy does not just blame the years of conflict for the process of ethnicization. He also cites the increased politicization of Afghan society since the 1960s, with the government's Pashtun nationalist ideology, as another factor in the ethnicization of Afghanistan.[336] Shahrani offers a similar long-term view, noting that the cleavages were apparent well before the conflicts started.[337] By the second half of the 1990s it was clear that the minorities of Afghanistan, who became increasingly empowered since 1978, would no longer passively accept Pashtun domination.[338] This ethnicization has progressed to the point where ethnicity became a "key factor of political alignment."[339]

6.2.3. Uzbek political and military organization: The various Uzbek emirates in Turkistan south of the Amu Darya in what is today northern Afghanistan were annexed by the Afghan state in the second half of the eighteenth century. Before 1888, when Abdur Rahman consolidated a centralized Afghan state, Uzbek tribal leaders (*amirs*, *begs*, and *moyzafids*) acted autonomously, despite "nominally" recognizing the Kabul government. Most of these Uzbek leaders collected taxes and provided soldiers for the Afghan state. The strongest among them were able to ignore

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[333] Schetter (2005), op cit, pp. 50-3.
[334] Ibid, pp. 60, 68.
[335] Simonsen (2004), op cit, p. 709.
[336] Roy (1995), op cit, pp. 105-6. Roy gives only one external factor in the ethnicization process: the creation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics
[337] Shahrani (2001a), op cit, p. 2.
[338] Hyman (2002), op cit, p. 299; Rais (1999), op cit, p. 6.
[339] Roy (1998), op cit, p. 209.

the government in Kabul. Murad Beg, Amir of Kunduz, was the most successful of these leaders, ruling a large territory in northeastern Afghanistan independently during the early 1800s.[340]

After 1888, when a mostly Pashtun military and political administration was imposed on the north, the Uzbek leaders lost most of their independence and power, and the Uzbek elites were confined to local governance at the village level. *Begs* and *moyzafids* became the middlemen between their rural village or tribe and the local government representative, who was usually a Pashtun. This arrangement lasted until the Soviet-Afghan war when the elites who were the traditional leaders in the Uzbek communities were executed or forced into exile.[341]

Jauzjanis: In response to the strong resistance during the Soviet-Afghan war, the Soviet army and the Afghan communist government followed a policy of "eviction, bombardment and destruction of infrastructure" in Pashtun areas. In contrast, in the more cooperative minority areas, especially in Uzbek areas, the Soviet Union delivered aid and development projects as a reward for cooperation. The Soviets and the Afghan government also gave the minorities more autonomy and helped them to form local militia units to fight against the mujahideen in their areas.[342] The largest and most successful of these was Dostum's Uzbek Jauzjani militia, whose initial job was to protect the natural gas fields and infrastructure in the north.[343] Dostum's first recruits came from his home province of Jauzjan and were all Uzbeks.[344] Dostum soon started recruiting from all the ethnic groups in the area, expanding from beyond the original membership of Uzbeks from the Jauzjan region.[345] During the 1980s in Jauzjan Dostum primarily recruited on an individual basis rather than recruiting a local commander who would bring his men and/or *qawm* with him.[346] Dostum later started recruiting groups (i.e. *qawms*) that were a coherent whole, to the detriment of his organizational control.[347]

The Uzbeks on the mujahideen side were active in a number of groups including Jamiat, Hekmatyar's Hizb, Haraqat-i Enqelab and others.[348] Among these groups the Uzbeks were most

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[340] J. Wood, P.B. Lord, M.B. Koshkaki, and Ludwig Adamec quoted in Rasuly-Paleczek (2001), op cit, p. 166.

[341] J.-H. Grevemeyer and Rasuly-Paleczek quoted in Rasuly-Paleczek (2001), op cit, pp. 166-7, 171.

[342] Rais (1999), op cit, p. 2.

[343] Rubin (1995a), op cit, p. 122; Rasanayagam (2003), op cit, p. 130; Giustozzi (2000), op cit, p. 222.

[344] Rasanayagam (2003), op cit, p. 130.

[345] Rubin (1995b), op cit, p. 160.

[346] Dorronsoro (2005), op cit, p. 184; Rubin (1995b), op cit, p. 160.

[347] Sinno (2002), op cit, p. 273.

[348] Roy (1990), op cit, pp. 220-2. The Uzbeks that joined Massoud's network lived in Badakhshan and may have joined for reasons of proximity: see Rubin (1995b), op cit, p. 218.

active in Haraqat, which had Uzbeks in military commander roles. However, according to Olivier Roy, this group's leaders were all Pashtun.[349] One source even claims that the only Uzbeks who joined the mujahideen in any significant numbers were the Central Asian *muhajireen*[350] Uzbeks who had fled Soviet Central Asia up in the 1920s and 1930s. This discrepancy is explained by noting that the *muhajireen* had a higher level of education and political awareness than the local Uzbeks.[351] The lack of Uzbek commanders in the mujahideen organizations may also be in part due to Dostum's effectiveness at the beginning of the conflict in "eliminating" those Uzbek commanders who would not join him.[352] Towards the end of the conflict most Uzbeks were moving towards joining government militias and a few to Hekmatyar's Hizb, although the Uzbeks and Turkic Moghol officers in Hizb still viewed Dostum as their leader.[353] Bernt Glatzer dissents from this view and argues that Haraqat was the most successful mujahideen group in attracting Uzbek towards the end of the Soviet occupation.[354] However, even Haraqat had problems retaining Uzbeks: by 1984 Uzbeks in Faryab left Haraqat for government militias because of the Pashtun domination of Haraqat.[355]

The only explicitly Uzbek group was Ittihad,[356] a Pakistani-funded armed group under the leadership of Azad Beg, the grandson of the last Khan of the Khokand Khanate. This Uzbek nationalist and secular organization that emerged from the leftist group Geruh-i Kar actively "infiltrated" Uzbek cells in Haraqat. However, because government intelligence agents openly infiltrated Ittihad, its status as a true resistance group is doubtful. Still, as late as 1987 it was being supplied with weapons by Pakistani intelligence.[357]

The government's minority-friendly policies attracted many Uzbeks into Dostum's militia.[358] However, Uzbeks joined the Jauzjani militia for diverse reasons, including the mujahideen parties' inability to provide them with aid and the government's offer to replace the

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[349] Glatzer (1998), op cit, p. 172; Rubin (1995b), op cit, p. 212.
[350] A term for Muslims refuges who flee religious persecution.
[351] Gilles Dorronsoro and Chantal Lobato quoted in Sinno (2002), op cit, p. 186.
[352] Sinno (2002), op cit, p. 186.
[353] Rubin (1995b), op cit, p. 234; Centlivres, Pierre and Micheline Centlivres-Demont (1997), op cit, p. 11.
[354] Glatzer (1998), op cit, p. 172.
[355] Roy (1999), op cit, pp. 129, 221.
[356] Different from the Ittihad of Rasul Sayyaf.
[357] Roy (1990), op cit, pp. 221, 231; Roy (1995), op cit, pp. 106, 126.
[358] Glatzer (1998), op cit, p. 172.

mujahideen as supplier.[359] In Faryab, many Uzbeks joined the ethnic militia because of their "hatred" for the local Pashtuns who politically dominated the region, similar to the reasons why the original Jauzjani recruits joined.[360] In 1982 Abdul Ghafar Pahlavan and 1,000 mujahideen under his command in Jauzjan and Faryab joined the government militia system.[361] However, this was possibly because of the violent conflicts between Uzbek commander Rasul Pahlavan and Tajik Jamiat commanders.[362] Furthermore, by 1986 some Uzbeks were joining government militias to receive protection from local mujahideen commanders and from the battles that resulted from those commanders operating in their areas.[363]

From 1986 to 1989 the Afghan government upgraded some of the militia units and gave their commanders more autonomy. The Jauzjani militia was now given the status of a regular army unit and renamed the 53rd Infantry Division. Dostum was given control of not only this division, but control over all military, police and security units in his area.[364] By 1991 the 53rd/Jauzjanis officially numbered as many as 40,000 soldiers and were equipped well enough to undertake operations outside their home region.[365] The Jauzjanis had developed a "command and control structure one normally associates with modern militaries in developing countries."[366] Consequently, by the end of the Soviet occupation, they were the only government force capable of offensive military operations.[367] However, despite its professional structure, Dostum treated the militia as his "personal property" and the militiamen were "personally loyal" to him.[368]

Junbesh-i Milli: In June 1992 Dostum was elected leader of Junbesh-i Milli-yi Islami (National Islamic Movement). Junbesh had its roots in Haraqat-i Shamal (Movement of the North), which was formed in January 1990 as an alliance between mujahideen and government

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[359] Giustozzi (2000), op cit, p. 210.

[360] Giustozzi (2000), op cit, pp. 125, 201; Rasanayagam (2003), op cit, p. 130.

[361] Giustozzi (2000), op cit, p. 201.

[362] Gilles Dorronsoro and Chantal Lobato quoted in Sinno (2002), op cit, p. 192.

[363] M. Pohly and M. Urban quoted in Giustozzi (2000), op cit, p. 125.

[364] Giustozzi (2003), op cit, p. 5.

[365] Rasanayagam (2003), op cit, p. 130; Dorronsoro (2005), op cit, p. 205. In 1988 the Jauzjanis even took over a Soviet garrison in Khandahar, see Rubin (1995b), op cit, p. 262.

[366] Only later was Dostum to partially revert to patronage structure. See: Sinno (2002), op cit, p. 254.

[367] Rubin (1995b), op cit, p. 160.

[368] Giustozzi, Antonio. (2002) 'Afghanistan: The Problems of Creating a New Afghan army', *International Industrial Information*, p. 17, available: www.newnations.com/specialreports/pdf/af.01.04.03.pdf

commanders whose goal was to resist Pashtun dominance in the north.[369] In 1992 the various factions negotiating in Kabul excluded Haraqat because, they claimed, it was a military, rather than a political group.[370] Haraqat's response was its transformation into Junbesh with the explicit goal of consolidating all political and military forces in the north under its control. Many political figures and various parties, motivated by their opposition to the Islamist parties, joined Junbesh, among them Ismailis, former communist Pashtun army officers who had fled the south, and even some former communists of the Khalq faction.[371] One of the Uzbek leaders who joined was Azad Beg, the leader of Ittihad. Azad Beg challenged Dostum for political leadership but lacked Dostum's military power and resources. Furthermore, he faced opposition from the other political parties that joined Junbesh. Consequently, despite not being a strong candidate when Junbesh was initially formed, by 1994 Dostum was its "undisputed leader."[372]

Junbesh lost some "components" through the years and eventually became an ethnic party for Uzbeks, no longer representing as many various interests as it previously had.[373] Antonio Giustozzi describes Junbesh as having transformed from an ineffective organization representing numerous interests (and having a "special place for Uzbeks") into an "effective political organization capable of carrying out tasks in a somewhat disciplined and co-coordinated way." Junbesh came to be an Uzbek organization despite Dostum's strategy of avoiding Uzbek nationalist rhetoric and of claiming to be an organization for all minorities.[374] Even with the Uzbek domination of Junbesh, Dostum was still able to "co-opt" the leadership of some northern Pashtuns as well as those of Hazaras and Uzbek-speaking Arabs in his area of control.[375]

During the civil war Dostum controlled many resources, including former Soviet weapons depots, important oil and gas fields, a functioning international airline, and duties and

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[369] Giustozzi, Antonio. (2005) 'The Ethnicisation of an Afghan Faction: Junbesh-I-Milli from its Origins to the Presidential Elections', *Crisis States Programme Working Paper*, No. 67. Crisis States Research Center (September 2005) Available online at: www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/WP67.pdf, pp. 1-6.

[370] A. Walwalji quoted in Giustozzi (2005), op cit, p. 2.

[371] Giustozzi (2005), op cit, pp. 1-6; Giustozzi (2002), op cit, p. 18; Rubin (1995b), op cit, p. 275. Dostum's political maneuvering during this time was likely aided by the advice of former Khalq communists. See: Giustozzi (2005), op cit, pp. 1-6; Giustozzi (2002), op cit, p. 18.

[372] Giustozzi (2005), op cit, pp. 1-6; Giustozzi (2002), op cit, p. 18.

[373] Giustozzi (2005), op cit, pp. 5-6.

[374] S. Rasuly quoted in Rasuly-Paleczek (2001), op cit, p. 175.

[375] Williams (2005), op cit.

fees from border crossings with Central Asian.[376] By 1997 Dostum was collecting taxes as well as operating a legal courts system.[377] Dostum even printed bank notes between 1994 and 1996.[378] Dostum's administration also operated health and educational systems, including the only functioning university in Afghanistan at the time.[379] The administration was relatively effective because Junbesh had left in place most of the administrative structures in its areas of control remaining from the Soviet era. Until the rise of the Taliban, Junbesh controlled most of the north.[380]

During the civil war most of the Uzbek population apparently supported Dostum.[381] However, despite this popularity in the northern cities he lacked the support of the rural population in areas without a Junbesh affiliated commander in charge, including part of the Uzbek rural population. This was probably the result of the looting by Dostum's troops.[382]

Civil war: After the withdrawal of Soviet troops Dostum made the preservation of his autonomy a priority. In 1991, Soviet aid to the government of Afghanistan ended and Najibullah's payments to Dostum for his army ceased.[383] Soon after Dostum revolted against Najibullah, though Dostum probably rebelled in response to Najibullah's attempts to more closely "monitor" the militias by appointing loyal Pashtun generals to the north to reassert central government control.[384] Dostum claimed that he moved against the government because Najibullah had "humiliated us and violated the rights of minorities."[385] In 1992 the new government acknowledged Dostum for his role in overthrowing Najibullah and promoted him. However, these were concessions made to him only after he declared the north to be autonomous

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[376] Magnus and Naby (1995), op cit, p. 616; Najafizada, Shoaib. (2005) 'Afghan warlord Dostam survives suicide attack, over 20 hurt', *ReliefWeb*, Available online at: www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EVIU-68TJRF?OpenDocument; Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 57.

[377] Maley (2002), op cit, p. 209.

[378] Rubin (2000) 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, 28(10), p. 1793.

[379] Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 57.

[380] Rieck (1997), op cit, p. 125, 127. This included the provinces of Jauzjan, Faryab, Balkh, Samangan, and parts of Sar-i Pul, Baghlan, and Kunduz

[381] Ahady (1995), op cit, p. 627; Rasuly-Paleczek, Gabriele (1998) 'Ethnic Identity versus Nationalism: The Uzbeks of North-Eastern Afghanistan and the Afghan State', in Atabaki and O'Kane (eds) *Post-Soviet Central Asia.* London: Tauris, p. 221; Williams (2003), op cit; Burns, John F. (1997) 'Afghan Fights Islamic Tide', *The New York Times*, 10/14/97. Online: www.pulitzer.org/year/1997/international-reporting/works/5/; Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 57.

[382] Giustozzi (2002), op cit, p. 18.

[383] Rubin (1995b), op cit, pp. 130-1; Magnus and Naby (1995), op cit, p. 616.

[384] Rubin (1995a), op cit, p. 131; Rubin (1995b), op cit, pp. 269-70.

[385] Rashid, Ahmed. (1992) 'Warriors of the North', in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (April 23, 1992), pp. 12-13.

and threatened to secede.[386] Dostum, due to lobbying from Uzbekistan and all the other regional states, stopped using separatist threats at this point.[387]

Since 1992, despite switching alliances numerous times, Dostum has always followed a strategy of balancing power among the factions, preventing the consolidation of a centralized governing authority, and preserving his autonomy in the north. Each time Dostum switched sides it was to check the rising power of one of the other factions.[388] For example, the mujahideen, who sought to keep Dostum from any role in the government, excluded him from the power-sharing agreements of 1992 and 1993.[389] Dostum had sided with Rabbani and Massoud in 1992, but the arrangement fell apart in 1993 because of Dostum's insistence on a share of power in Kabul without sharing power in the north.[390] The exclusion from government is why Dostum briefly allied with Hekmatyar, who was also left out of power.[391] In early 1994 Dostum, fearing the rising power of Massoud and Rabbani, joined with Wahdat and Hekmatyar.[392] Later, in August 1996, as the Taliban was advancing towards Kabul, the Uzbek Junbesh general Abdul Malik was in favor of an alliance with the Taliban against the Rabbani government in Kabul. However, Dostum rejected this proposal and instead signed a cease-fire with Massoud.[393] When the Taliban advanced on Kabul Dostum announced that, if attacked by the Taliban, he would "declare the independence of the Republic of South Turkistan."[394] This failure to reach an agreement was in spite of the best efforts by the Pakistani government to help secure a deal between the two.[395] However, after the Taliban took Kabul, Dostum realized that the Taliban posed a threat to all non-Pashtuns. So in October 1996 he met with Massoud, Rabbani, and Khalili to form an alliance to resist the Taliban.[396]

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[386] Rubin (1995a), op cit, p. 131; Magnus and Naby 1995, op cit, p. 616.

[387] Rubin (1995b), op cit, p. 275.

[388] Giustozzi (2003), op cit, p. 7; Maley (1998), op cit, p. 10; Maley (2002), op cit, p. 171; Matinuddin, Kamal. (2000) *The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 116-7.

[389] Magnus and Naby (1995), op cit, p. 616. His exclusion reflected the influence of the Tajik leader Rabbani. See: Rubin (1995a), op cit, p. 132.

[390] Ahady (1998), op cit, pp. 124-5.

[391] Marsden (2001), op cit, pp. 17-9.

[392] Maley (2002), op cit, p. 203.

[393] Sreedhar et al. (1998), op cit, p. 38.

[394] Rubin (1995a), op cit, p. 142.

[395] Rashid (1998), op cit, p. 82.

[396] Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 52-3; Dorronsoro (2005), op cit, p. 254. Another reason for Dostum's hostility towards the Taliban was that he saw the execution of Najibullah as his possible fate. See: Matinuddin (2000), op cit, 209-10.

The Taliban defeat of Junbesh: Despite relative peace, prosperity and openness during Dostum's control of the north there was some level of dissatisfaction with his leadership. He was being blamed for "corruption and nepotism," and was being accused of living a luxurious lifestyle while soldiers went unpaid. Dissatisfaction also grew because of inflation and the rising price of food and other commodities.[397] As the Taliban advanced north in May 1997, Abdul Malik, Dostum's second-in-command, made a deal with the Taliban. This was apparently motivated both by personal ambition and by the widespread belief that Dostum was behind his brother's assassination, and perhaps even by delivery of a large bribe.[398] As part of the deal Malik's troops were to turn on the rest of the Northern Alliance, including fellow Uzbek forces under Dostum's command. In return, Malik was promised autonomy in the north until the formation of a central government that was to follow general elections.[399] The Taliban and Malik's Uzbek troops from his native Faryab quickly took four provinces and Dostum was forced to flee to Uzbekistan and then on to Turkey.[400] This deal, however, did not bring Malik what he was promised: he was offered only a minor government position and the offers of autonomy and equal ethnic representation were withdrawn.[401] After a Hazara uprising in Mazar the local population attacked the Taliban troops in the city. Malik saw his opportunity and turned on the Taliban, taking four provinces back from the Taliban and executing many of the Taliban prisoners.[402] However, Malik was unable to attract the same support that Dostum had and the Uzbek forces were unable to re-unite.[403] Consequently, despite entering into an alliance with Malik in June of 1997, the Tajik and Hazara forces were not able to work effectively with him.[404]

In September 1997 Dostum returned from Turkey and easily took back control from Malik, who then fled to Iran.[405] However, despite Dostum's return to power, his "aura of

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[397] Matinuddin (2000), op cit, p. 97; Maley (2002), op cit, p. 209.
[398] Ewans, Martin. (2001) *Afghanistan: A New History*. London: Curzon Press, p. 208; Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 57; Maley (2002), op cit, p. 229; Giustozzi (2003), op cit, p. 9. Kamal Matinuddin identifies Rasul and Malik as stepbrothers: see Matinuddin (2000), op cit, p. 97.
[399] Sreedhar et al (1998), op cit, p. 39.
[400] Rashid (2000a), op cit, p. 58.
[401] Rashid (2000a), op cit, pp. 58-9; Dorronsoro (2005), op cit, p. 254.
[402] Rashid (2000a), op cit, pp. 61-3.
[403] Marsden (2001), op cit, p. 22.
[404] Rashid (2000a), op cit, pp. 61-3.
[405] Rashid (2000a), op cit, pp. 62-3; Matinuddin (2000), op cit, p. 175.

competence had been very seriously compromised."[406] While Dostum did manage to retake Mazar in November, Junbesh was now split between Malik and Dostum supporters, and no longer as strong as in the past.[407] When the Taliban returned north in August 1998 they captured Mazar and Dostum's army was destroyed.[408] At the end of 1999 both Dostum and Malik returned to northern Afghanistan and attempted to reorganize their forces. Although they managed to attract a total of about 2,000 fighters, they were unable to co-ordinate with the Northern Alliance.[409] Coordination improved in March 2001 following a meeting between Dostum and Malik arranged by Iran where the rivals agreed to form a new front against the Taliban.[410] One month later Dostum returned from Iran and managed to organize a force of about 2,000 fighters at his command in the Balkhab district.[411] By November 2001, when the Americans arrived, Dostum only had 100 men in his army and 2,000 part-time militiamen.[412]

7. Conclusion

Uzbek communities in Tajikistan and Afghanistan had equally strong political opportunity for ethno-political mobilization with the disintegration of central authority in their respective countries. The Uzbeks in Afghanistan had autonomy in the north throughout the latter part of the Soviet-Afghan conflict until the Taliban capture of Mazar in 1998. The Uzbeks in Tajikistan had similar opportunities: during the civil war Uzbeks in the Leninabad *Oblast* were geographically isolated from the conflict in other parts of Tajikistan. Although Uzbeks in the south, while fully engaged in the civil war, were able to reach an agreement that gave their communities autonomy,[413] this lasted only until the Kulobi faction was able to consolidate its power and defeat Boimatov and Khudoberdiev, the protectors of Uzbeks in their areas. In

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[406] Maley (2002), op cit, p. 230.

[407] Dorronsoro (2005), op cit, p. 255; Nojumi (2002), op cit, p. 163. Malik's forces were now led by his brother Gulai: see Nojumi (2002), op cit, p. 167.

[408] Goodson (2001), op cit, p. 175; Matinuddin (2000), op cit, pp. 198-9.

[409] Goodson (2001), op cit, pp. 84-6.

[410] Rashid (2001a), op cit.

[411] Williams (2005), op cit. This was short of his boast that upon his return "[...] all Uzbeks would take up guns and start an uprising." See: Coll, Steve. (2004) *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden.* New York: Penguin Books, p. 564.

[412] Berntsen, Gary and Ralph Pezzulo. (2005) *Jaw Breaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda; A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander.* New York: Crown Publishers, pp. 133-4.

[413] Nourzhanov (2005), op cit, p. 118.

contrast, the Uzbeks in Afghanistan mobilized successfully and created a strong military and political movement (Junbesh) to fight for the interests of their community.

With regard to a credible commitment problem, the Uzbeks in Afghanistan saw the rise of the Taliban, and the Taliban's reassertion of Pashtun dominance, as a threat to their community. Later, during the Taliban offensive in the north, the massacre of Uzbeks civilians and captured soldiers strongly reinforced the perception of a credible commitment problem. In particular, the Uzbek elite were the most threatened by the reassertion of Pashtun dominance since they stood to lose their positions of power, and possibly their lives. These problems of credible commitments encouraged Uzbeks in Afghanistan, at both a communal and elite level, to mobilize and resist the imposition of a central authority, especially a Pashtun authority.

Tajikistan had no equivalent history of conflict between Tajiks and Uzbeks, two communities that had culturally integrated, especially in the north. Although there was a credible commitment problem between the Gharmi Tajiks and southern Uzbeks who fought each other in Qurghonteppe, this ended early in the conflict when the Gharmis and their allies were defeated and marginalized. Even though the rise of the Kulobi faction marginalized the Uzbeks in Tajikistan, the threat to the Uzbek community was very mild compared to the threat that the Uzbeks of Afghanistan faced. Indeed, many Uzbeks in the north even supported the Kulobi leader Rahmonov after 1994 out of a concern for stability.[414]

The mobilization of Uzbeks in Afghanistan was also encouraged by the external support that Junbesh and Rashid Dostum received, which included military, financial, and humanitarian aid for Junbesh. The Uzbeks in Tajikistan received no such support. Although early in the conflict the Popular Front received direct assistance,[415] this was in the form of support for the Popular Front as a whole, not for the Uzbeks in particular. Furthermore, this aid benefited the Kulobis, who dominated the Popular Front militarily and who later received Russian support.[416] Although Uzbekistan later gave limited support to Boimatov and Khudoberdiev, leaders who represented the interests of the Uzbeks in their areas of control, they only had narrow constituencies in Hissor and Qurghonteppe, respectively.

At the start of Afghanistan civil war, the Uzbeks could already rely on Rashid Dostum's faction, a mobilizing structure of a military nature. Dostum's Jauzjani militia, soon to become

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[414] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 89.
[415] Akhmedov (1998), op cit, p. 172; Niyazi (1998), op cit, p. 162; Rubin (1998), op cit, p. 154.
[416] Gretsky (1995), op cit, pp. 232-3.

Junbesh-i Milli, controlled a large area of northern Afghanistan, enjoyed access to many resources and had much combat experience. All of this prepared the Uzbeks well for the civil war. This is quite different for the Uzbeks in Tajikistan who had no equivalent mobilizing structure. Furthermore, Tajikistan's Uzbeks, particularly the northern Uzbeks, were part of the Leninabadi faction at the onset of civil war.[417] This faction was of a political nature only and lacked a military component like Dostum's faction in Afghanistan. Participating in a strong political faction served the Uzbeks well during the Soviet era,[418] but was of no long-term benefit during Tajikistan's civil war. While many southern Uzbeks mobilized militarily under Khudoberdiev in Qurghonteppe and under Boimatov in Hissor, these two factions became marginalized once the Kulobis consolidated power. Also, it is likely that the lack of any strong Uzbek faction in the north to ally with, the concern for local issues, primarily security, and the geographic isolation from Uzbeks in the north all contributed to the lack of any coordination with Uzbeks in the north. The effect of all these factors was a fractured Uzbek "community" that was concerned with local issues and without any national-level leadership.

The above analysis suggests that the most important variable in the two cases examined is the strength or weakness of the mobilizing structures at the onset of the conflicts. The weakness of the "political opportunity" argument is its tautological nature: if the minority mobilized, there must have been an opportunity, and vice versa. Along the lines of this argument, it could be argued that a strong mobilizing structure created and maintained the opportunity by weakening the state.[419] As for the external support variable, the importance of foreign aid has not been adequately demonstrated. For example, it is unknown what portion of Junbesh's resources was provided by outside sponsors and what was generated domestically. There is also a problem with relying on "credible commitment" as an explanatory variable. A minority group may mobilize not because of a perceived threat, but rather for the rational pursuit of individual or group

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[417] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 217; Horowitz (2001), op cit, p. 650; Roy (1997), op cit, pp. 135-6.

[418] Fumagalli (2005), op cit, p. 217; Horowitz (2001), op cit, p. 650.

[419] Here I confine this argument to Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Analysis elsewhere has challenged the concept that state and society are involved in a zero-sum/ inverse power relationship. See: Nugent, Jeffrey B. (1993) 'Between State, Market and Households: A Neoinstitutional Analysis of Local Organizations and Institutions', *World Development*, Vol. 21, No. 8: pp. 629; Putnam, Robert. (1993) 'The Prosperous Community', *American Prospect*, No. 13 (Spring): p. 42; Migdal, Joel S. (1994) 'The State in Society: An Approach to Struggles for Domination', in *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*. Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue, eds. Cambridge University Press: pp 7-36.

benefits. In contrast to the other variables, differences in the presence or strength of mobilizing structures best account for the disparities in Uzbek mobilization in the Tajik and Afghan civil wars.

The Uzbeks in Afghanistan successfully mobilized during the civil war and maintained autonomy for their community until the Taliban defeat of Junbesh in 1998. This Uzbek mobilization was successful because all four variables discussed in this paper worked to encourage mobilization: (a) The Uzbek's stronghold in the north was isolated from the rest of Afghanistan, a state which had collapsed, allowing political space in which to mobilize (political opportunity); (b) both the masses and the elites feared the domination of the Taliban, giving them both reason to mobilize and fight (credible commitment problem); (c) the Uzbek faction received foreign support that gave them the resources required to maintain the strength of their mobilizing structure and resist the other factions (external support); and (d) the Uzbeks had a strong militia and political party that had progressively built strength through the Soviet-Afghan war and then further strengthened when it operated in an open political opportunity environment, received external support and had constituents motivated out of fear to resist the reestablishment of central governance (strong mobilizing structure). In contrast, the Uzbeks in Tajikistan, despite having the same advantage of acting in an environment with no effective central authority and, in the case of the northern Uzbeks, being geographically isolated from their rivals (political opportunity), were unable to mobilize successfully. This lack of mobilization is explained by: (a) the absence of a threat to the northern Uzbek community, who peacefully coexisted with the Tajiks in the region (no credible commitment problem); (b) the low level of support given to factions representing Uzbeks in Tajikistan (low external support); (c) the non-military nature of the Khojenti faction that most Uzbeks were a part of at the onset of civil war, as well as the failure of Boimatov and Khudoberdiev (weak mobilizing structure). In short, when the Uzbeks of Afghanistan were threatened, they had a strong mobilizing structure supported from abroad to represent them politically and defend them militarily. In contrast, the Uzbeks of Tajikistan had no such mobilizing structure, no such foreign support, and, for the northern Uzbeks, no serious threat to their community. The result was significant ethnic Uzbek mobilization in Afghanistan and very little in Tajikistan.

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